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There is wide agreement among academics and policy makers that democracy is a
universal value—it brings with it a more secure, stable and prosperous society. One
should therefore try to identify causes of democracy. In this thesis I study the short
term effect of economic growth on changes in democracy. A quick glance at data
tells us that wealthy countries are democratic, and common wisdom suggests these
countries are democratic because of their wealth. The main contribution of my thesis
is to question this view. I make progress to existing literature by taking time series
persistence and simultaneity issues in the data into account. Formal tests are estab-
lished, and they suggest that both problems are present. I therefore first difference
the data and use an instrument variable approach during estimation. The econometric
framework provides a couple of interesting results. First, once time series persistence
is accounted for, the estimated effect of income on democracy changes from positive to
negative and statistically significant. Second, when economic growth is instrumented
the point estimate drops even further, making it quantitatively important as well.
These findings might be important for policy making, as they imply that one should
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1.1 Motivation and background
“Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter
aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, protect
American citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold hu-
man and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises and refugee flows, im-
prove the global environment, and protect human health.”
U.S. Department of State (2013)
Promoting democracy is not only on the U.S. policy agenda. Most academics and pol-
icy makers agree that democracy has a number of positive implications. Rulers rule
on behalf of the population, and depend on their support to stay in office. Democratic
processes will therefore provide outcomes more consistent with the will of citizens. Ba-
sic human and political rights are respected. The democratic peace thesis upholds that
democracies do not go to war against each other (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson
and Morrow, 2003, 218). In line with this view, one can think that international de-
mocratization processes will reduce both the frequency and severity of conflicts around
the world. Democracy is furthermore argued to have a positive effect on economic de-
velopment and welfare, at least in the long run (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008).
The overall picture is that democratic systems undoubtedly seem better than any other
alternative. Given that democracy has so many positive implications for societies, it
is crucial to identify the mechanisms leading up to this form of government. In this
thesis I will study the effect of income on democracy.
At first sight, it might seem obvious that higher income leads to democratization.
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Indeed, one of the most robust patterns when looking at cross-country data is the
positive relationship between the two. This stylized fact is reproduced in Figure 1.1,
which plots (log) per capita income against democracy. Each point in the figure
represents an income-democracy observation at the country-year level. A simple least
squares line is included to highlight the sign of the relationship. The regression line
demonstrates once and for all a positive relationship between the two variables, and
uncertainty bands reveal that the null hypothesis (no correlation) is rejected at any
reasonable confidence level.
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The stylized fact reproduced in the figure seems to have established some kind of
premise for the way many researchers approach a potential causal relation between
income and democracy. In fact, there is a substantial number of studies, includ-
ing Lipset (1959)’s influential modernization theory, that readably take the positive
income-democracy correlation as evidence for a causal effect of income on democracy.1
With this as a starting point, they set out to explain why increased income leads to
democracy. Even those who do not take for granted a positive effect seem to constrain
1For other studies that claim a positive association see; Dahl (1971), Huntington (1991),
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), Barro (1999), Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen
and O’Halloran (2006) and Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2011).
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their analysis to a one-sided hypothesis—the null of no effect is tested against the
alternative—higher income causes higher levels of democracy.2
However, Figure 1.1 demonstrates nothing else than a positive raw correlation. In
particular, it is silent about any causal relationships, including the timing of causation.
Does income causes democracy, or is it the other way around? What about other
factors not part of the plot, which explain both high income and high democracy?
Does income and democracy co-move once these factors are taken into account? Are
causal effects different in the short run than in the long run? Figure 1.1 is silent
about these issues. Thus, one cannot infer causality based on the regression slope in
the figure. This is important to realize if one wants to provide policy advices, as the
validity of such advises hinges critically upon causal relationships. With this lesson in
mind I set out to determine the causal short term effect of income on democracy. In
contrast to the large bulk of existing empirical work, I argue that income can actually
hamper democratic development. At least in the short run.
Let me explain how. First, national income represents a potential economic prize
for those who are able to gain monopoly power over the state. This is particularly
true for income that can be reached by institutions controlled by the government.
When national income is high, then there is more to grab for an autocratic state
leader who consider diverting resources. Thus, increased income will, everything else
equal, strengthen the ruling elite’s incentive to push for autocracy.3 Second, a wealthy
government has more resources to secure its position and fight off opponents. Revenues
allow the ruling elite to build up military and police capacity, to monitor its citizens,
and to chase down any potential threat. It is undoubtedly very costly to enforce
monopoly power. Third, an alternative to brute force is economic buy-off. Autocratic
regimes can invest in infrastructure to please the population, or buy off bureaucrats
or opposition groups. In the wake of the Arab Spring for instance, Saudi Arabian
leaders strategically increased investments in public goods. Compared to the rulers
in Libya and Syria, these leaders also remained relatively effortless in power. All of
these strategies can reduce the risk that citizens raise against the rulers, and thereby
reduce the probability of democratization. At least in the short run. Thus, increased
governmental income might not only give the elite an increased incentive to push for
autocracy, it can also give them increased opportunities to do so.
2A recent example is Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008), who report negative and
significant income coefficients, but fail to comment upon them. The main conclusion in this paper is
that income does not affect democracy.
3Increased governmental income will also alter the incentives of the citizens. I take this into
account in the theoretical model presented in this thesis.
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1.2 Main contribution and findings
To formalize the arguments above, I construct a simple game theoretical model. The
model demonstrates how increased governmental income changes the players’ incen-
tives. A key result is that governmental income, when it reaches a certain level, shifts
the equilibrium from democracy to autocracy. Readers should note that the model does
not offer any complete or general theory about the link between income and democ-
racy. Not even near. Rather, its purpose is to formalize one possible mechanism (of
many) that can hamper democratic development in the wake of higher income.
This thesis’ main objective is to investigate whether the data can inform us about
a causal effect of income on democracy. Two econometric concerns make this task
extra challenging. First, both income and democracy posit high persistence over time
in most countries. If the levels of these time series are sufficiently persistent (that is, if
they consist of a unit root), then they violate the standard assumption of stationarity.
If not controlled for, this will lead to biased estimates. Most studies in the literature
do not address the problem of unit root. In contrast, I formally test the hypothesis
of a unit root and find this to be the case in both series. I then solve the issue by
first differencing income and democracy in the econometric analysis. Consequently, it
is the effect of economic growth on changes in democracy that is estimated. However,
if the level equation is correctly specified, then the estimate from the first differenced
equation will effectively reflect level effects. The reason is that the relationship between
economic growth and democratic change on the one hand, and between economic
income level and the level of democracy on the other, should be qualitatively similar.
Intuitively, higher economic growth must give higher income levels. This is true by
the very definition of these concepts. The same goes for the link between level and
change in democracy. It is therefore hard to see how the effect of income growth on
changes in democracy can differ qualitatively from the effect of the level of income on
the level of democracy.4 After income and democracy have been first differenced, the
link between the two is found to be negative.
Second, and equally important, there is the issue of reversed causality. In particu-
lar, it is possible that income growth and democratization affect each other simultane-
ously. If democratization has a causal effect on income growth, then failing to take this
into account will result in biased estimates. This is true regardless of the causal effect
of income growth on democratization. Interestingly, most studies of the link between
4An alternative argument can be formed using a standard difference equation. Consider for in-
stance the linear equation yit = βxit−1. The first difference is ∆yit = β∆xit−1, where the coefficient
in the second equation by definition, is identical to the one in the first equation. Thus, if the first
equation is true, one can always estimate the second and obtain the same result.
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income and democracy seem to either abstract from the simultaneity problem all to-
gether, or to hope that lagged variables solve the problem. An important contribution
of this thesis is the attempt to address the simultaneity problem in a proper manner.
To this end I take an instrumental variables approach. Instrumental variables are
used to filter out endogenous variation in explanatory variables, and thereby obtain a
measure with exogenous variation only. This variation is then used to identify a causal
effect on the dependent variable. Reversed causality is therefore controlled for in my
case if the instruments chosen are exogenous (Wooldridge, 2009). Two different in-
strumental estimators are applied. The first one is the two stage least squares (2SLS)
estimator. I use climatic natural disasters and global economic growth as instruments
for (country-level) economic growth. The second estimator is the one constructed by
Arellano and Bond (1991). It is a GMM-type estimator, and allows me to instrument
all explanatory variables. After simultaneity problems in the data are addressed, the
negative effect of income growth on democratization turns quantitatively important.
In sum, the main conclusion from the econometric analysis is that controlling for
unit roots and simultaneity alters the well-established positive effect of income on
democracy completely. A negative effect of economic growth on democratization is in
itself hard to reconcile with the conventional wisdom, which is that wealthy countries
are democratic because they are wealthy. While this finding is in contrast to the results
in most existing income–democracy studies (Fayad, Bates and Hoeﬄer (2012) being
the exception), my results are in line with findings from the resource-curse literature.
This literature emphasizes how higher income can pose a challenge rather than a
blessing to countries. Among the arguments used are those I have presented above.
An interesting question arises. If increased income has a negative effect on de-
mocratization, why then are so many wealthy countries democratic? First, it must be
kept in mind that the result is conditional upon all else being equal. Thus, I am not
claiming that Norway will turn autocratic following high growth. Rather, for certain
values on other factors, an income increase will have a negative effect on democracy.
Second, even though I do not find any strong evidence for a long term effect of income
on democracy. The results from an error correction model (see chapter 8) instead
suggest that if anything, the effect turns positive with time. This offers a possible ex-
planation for why most wealthy countries are democratic, even though the short term
effect of income growth on changes in democracy is negative. However, it is hard to
reconcile a negative short term effect with a positive long term effect—these two have
an embedded contradiction. A more credible explanation is that a number of other
factors than income render nations democratic. Acemoglu et al. (2008) for instance,
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point at historical factors as the explanation.
Even though I look into short term effects, my results should have substantial policy
implications. Governments in developed countries, international financial agencies
and aid organizations, seem to base their policies on an underlying assumption that
increased income has positive implications for democracy, peace and development more
generally. If the effect of income on democracy instead is negative, then providing
financial aid and encouraging economic development in poor autocratic countries can
come at the expense of hampering democratization. The solution to this problem
should not be to stop money transfers to poor countries all together. Rather, one
should ask how money transfers can be designed to prevent negative effects on the
democratic processes. It is possibly better to commit to long term aid programs
rather than one time transfers, given that the negative effect of income on democracy
only seems to hold in the short term. Furthermore, payments should be conditioned
upon being used for the common good, rather than diverted for personal benefits for
the few. Even though there are weaknesses with the econometric analysis presented in
this thesis, the results nevertheless imply that one cannot take the conventional view
of income as positive for democracy for granted.
1.3 Defining democracy
There is no consensus in the literature regarding how democracy should be defined.
Furthermore, no two democratic regimes are exactly equal. The Norwegian parliamen-
tary system differs substantially from the presidential system in Finland. The Finnish
system is very different from the presidential system in South Africa, where the Pres-
ident gets elected by the legislature rather than by the population. Democracies do
however, have some important commonalities. In essence, democracy is “government
by the people for the people”. The question is what this statement amounts to in
practice.
The literature is divided between those who define democracy according to the exis-
tence of particular political institutions (institutional definition), and researchers who
base their definition on some underlying principles (substantial definition) (Knutsen,
2011, 46). To understand democracy, it is not enough to point at a list of institutions
that needs to be in place for it to function. Rather, a deeper understanding of why the
institutions are democratic is needed. Accordingly, I follow the second approach and
define democracy based on three interdependent criteria I find decisive for democracy.
First, there must be institutions and procedures through which citizens can express
6
their preferences about political leaders and alternative politics.5
Second, there must be institutional constraints on the power of the executive. In
other words, there must be checks and balances on the power of the executive to
prevent rule based on personal interests (extending own powers etc.).
Third, citizens must be guaranteed civil liberties (including rule of law) and polit-
ical rights. Rule of law is an important aspect in democratic societies. All citizens,
including the elite, are equal in front of the law (O’Donnell, 2001, 24-25). Besides being
important determinants for democracy in itself, factors such as freedom of expression,
organization, the right to join political parties and run for office are also necessary for
the first criterion to be valid (Beetham, 1994, 28-29).
Researchers do not only disagree about how democracy should be defined, they
also have different opinions about how it should be measured. In particular, it is
debated whether democracy should be conceptualized as a dichotomous or graded
phenomenon (Collier and Adcock, 1999). Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski
(1996) uphold that while some regimes might be more democratic than others, they
should not be considered democratic unless offices are contested. They argue that
“while democracy can be more or less advanced, on cannot be half-democratic: there is
a natural zero point” (1996, 21). Thus, the researchers make the case for a dichotomous
measure of democracy. Bollen and Jackman (1989, 618) on the other hand, take a
graded approach and argue that democracy is “always a matter of degree”. Collier
and Levitsky (1997) emphasize the extensive number inconsistent (hybrid) regimes in
the world today. The regimes have some democratic features, but are not considered
to be (fully) democratic (see also Diamond (1999)). In using a dichotomous measure
of democracy, much of this information would not be taken into account (Hadenius
and Teorell, 2005, 91). For instance, one would lose the information that Norway is
more democratic than Bolivia, even though both countries have elections for political
office. The chosen democracy threshold in dichotomous measures furthermore leads
to potential reliability and validity problems (Elkins, 2000, 293).
I want to utilize as much information as possible about the extent of democracy
and avoid the potential reliability and validity problems described above. I therefore
view democracy as a regime form in which a country can approximate more or less
well, at any given point in time. In the empirical analysis I study changes in level
5This criterion covers the aspects that Dahl (1971) and Dahl (1998) label contestation and par-
ticipation. Contestation requires that political offices are filled through competition. Thus, elections
for office positions must be held. Participation implies that citizens are guaranteed the right to par-
ticipate in the political process. In representative democracies an important aspect of this is that all
citizens above a certain age have the right to vote in political elections. Furthermore, there must be
channels through which the citizens can express their preferences regarding specific policies.
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of democracy from one year to the next. Democratization is therefore referred to as
changes in democracy over time. Note that democratization can take negative values
(as is the case when there are movements towards autocracy). My main measure of
democracy is the variable Polity2 from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr and
Jaggers, 2012). I explain why in section 5.2.
This thesis does not distinguish between democratic transition and democratic
consolidation (see e.g. Schmitter (1994) and Schedler (1998)). Instead, all movements
in democracy over time are labeled democratization (also if the country already is
considered to be democratic). Thus, it makes little sense in this thesis to distinguish
between the phase when a country makes the shift from autocracy to democracy
(transition), and further improvement of democratic quality for a country that is
already considered to be democratic (consolidation).6 A further distinction in the
literature is between studies of transitions towards democracy (democratization) and
democratic survival. I focus on the first aspect and set out to determine the effect of
income growth on democratization. Income has however also been found important
for democratic survival (see e.g. Przeworski and Limongi (1997)).
1.4 Summary of content
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter two reviews a number of relevant
studies of the link between income and democracy. In particular, it illustrates that
the debate regarding income and democracy over the years largely has turned into a
debate regarding the relevance of Lipset’s (1959) modernization theory. In chapter
three I develop a simple game theoretical model that illustrates a possible mechanism
that links income negatively to democracy. Assuming that people act strategic, it is
reasonable to think that income growth changes the players’ incentives. Concretely,
economic growth gives the elite an increased incentive to push for autocracy as there is
more to grab. The elite can also use the increased revenues to buy off the population
and make them accept autocracy (at least in the short term). In chapter four I
review econometric methods. Special emphasis is put on the instrumental variables
approaches, which address the issue of simultaneity (amongst others). Chapter five
outlines the dataset and variable definitions, and also presents descriptive statistics.
Chapter six provides an introductory analysis. I first replicate the most common
finding in the literature, namely that of a positive effect of income on democracy.
6Teorell (2010, 32) points out that such a distinction can be more fruitful for researchers that
operate with a dichotomous conceptualization of democracy.
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Both variables are used in levels. Then I perform panel data tests for unit roots
and simultaneity. These tests suggest that neither the presence of unit roots nor
simultaneity in the data can be ruled out. This renders the results from the level model
unreliable. Chapter seven reports the results from the main analysis. Once presence
of unit roots are controlled for, the effect of income on democracy turns statistically
negative. Furthermore, once simultaneity problems in the data are addressed, the effect
also becomes of quantitative importance. A battery of robustness checks is conducted
and the results are found to be relatively robust. In chapter eight I dig deeper into the
results and ask what kind of observations that drive the results. I find that income
seems to have a stronger negative effect on democracy in democracies and inconsistent
regimes, than it does in autocracies. Furthermore, income seems to hamper democratic
development more for countries that are on a path towards democracy. Finally, I do
not find strong evidence of a long term effect of income on democracy. If anything





Over the years, the link between income and democracy has received considerable
attention which has resulted in a vast body of research.1 This is reasonable as the
association addresses the effect of one of the most important means in international
politics; money transfers, on one of the superior goals; the expansion of democracy.
Despite the extensive number of studies however, researchers have not been able to
come to an agreement regarding the link between the two. The aim of this chapter is
not to give an extensive review of the income–democracy literature. Instead, some key
contributions that are representative for the larger debate are outlined. I also review
a couple of studies that argue that economic growth in some instances can be a curse
rather than a blessing.
2.1 Income and democracy
Interest regarding the association between income and democracy dates all the way
back to Aristotle, who claimed that only in a wealthy society with relatively few
people living in poverty, could democracy arise and survive (Moral-Benito 2011:1).
The observed correlation between income and democracy (reproduced in Figure 1.1),
is furthermore the cornerstone of Lipset’s (1959) influential modernization theory.
Lipset and other modernization theorists claimed that democracies were created and
preserved through a process of modernization. This process was argued to involve
changes in industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education (Lipset, 1959, 80).
Lipset claimed that these factors were so closely interrelated that they formed one
common factor; economic development. In particular, the modernization process was
1Furthermore, in political science few questions have been given more attention than the query of
what leads to democracy. Thus, there is an enormous democracy literature. However, as this thesis
studies the effect of income on democracy I only review this part of the literature.
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assumed to strengthen the middle class, who no longer would tolerate repressive po-
litical regimes. As a result democracy would evolve. Using simple statistical analysis,
Lipset found that economic development correlated with democracy.
The modernization theory seems to have created a premise in the study of income
and democracy. As a consequence, subsequent studies addressing the link between
the two, make themselves relevant by either supporting or rejecting the theory. Most
of these studies have argued for the modernization theory (see e.g. Dahl (1971),
Huntington (1991), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Londregan and Poole (1996),
Barro (1999), Boix and Stokes (2003), Epstein et al. (2006), Kennedy (2010), Boix
(2011), Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2011), Treisman (2012)).2 In fact, for a long
time the positive effect of income on democracy was widely accepted as a stylized fact
in comparative politics (Geddes, 1999, 117).
A number of more recent studies however, have argued that economic development
does not create democracy per se. Przeworski and Limongi (1997, 167) for instance,
argue that regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita income increase.3
Instead, once countries have become democratic, for whatever reason, higher levels of
GDP per capita increase the probability of remaining democratic. Thus, as history
evolves, wealthy democracies will increase in numbers, because whenever dictatorships
dies in wealthy countries, democracy will be there to stay (Przeworski and Limongi,
1997, 159). The researchers claim that there are two reasons for why democracy is
more likely to die in poor countries. First, the marginal utility of consumption is
higher in poor countries because they have little to consume. This implies that the
utility gain of becoming a dictator and thereby taking all wealth is high. Second,
poor countries, which typically have little capital, have much to gain by increasing
the capital stock. Thus, the capital stock will increase faster in poor countries. This
implies that the speed in catching-up following conflict and capital destruction is higher
in poor countries. In sum, the struggle for dictatorship is less attractive in wealthy
countries, because the gain from getting all rather than part of the total income is
smaller. Furthermore, the recuperation from destruction is slower (Przeworski and
Limongi, 1997, 166).
Boix and Stokes (2003) on the other hand, criticize Przeworski and Limongi (1997)
for only including country-year observations after 1950. When extending the time se-
ries further back, they find economic development to have a significantly positive effect
2Several of these studies however, argue for a conditional income effect and emphasize different
mechanisms that links income to democracy. For qualitative studies on the link between income and
democracy see Moore (1966) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992).
3See also Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000).
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on democracy. However, Boix and Stokes also criticize the modernization theory for
assuming that democratization is triggered by income development in itself. Instead
they argue that democratization is caused by other changes that accompany develop-
ment. In particular, lower levels of income inequality. When countries develop, income
becomes more equally distributed. Thus, the ruling elite will find a democratic tax
structure less expensive as the country gets wealthier. Consequently, democratization
becomes more likely (Boix and Stokes, 2003, 539-540).4 Kennedy (2010) on the other
hand, defends the modernization theory. He claims that there is a positive link, but
that it is conditional. Kennedy argues that the results from the studies that reject
the modernization theory are driven by a conceptual issue regarding how they mea-
sure democracy. Democratic transitions should not be regarded as a one-time, unique
and exclusive phenomenon (Kennedy, 2010, 797). When changing this assumption,
Kennedy finds that there is a positive link between economic development and democ-
ratization. There is however, an inherent contradiction. Income development has an
opposite effect on onset and outcome of institutional change. Since economic develop-
ment is generally stabilizing for all regime types, at the same time as it increases the
costs for the ruler to bring about institutional change, economic development decreases
the probability of major institutional change. However, because economic development
makes it harder to establish a new autocratic regime and increases the attractiveness
for the masses to gain power, regime changes that does follow economic development,
are more likely to be towards democracy than autocracy (Kennedy, 2010, 797). Thus,
Kennedy concludes that the effect of income on democracy is positive but conditional.
Acemoglu et al. (2008) on the other hand, side with Przeworski and Limongi (1997)
and argue that the established association between income and democracy is spuri-
ous. When controlling for country specific factors they show that the positive effect of
GDP per capita on democratization disappears. The same happens when they use in-
strumental variable approaches to control for the possible simultaneity problems in the
data. The authors argue that many developed countries are democratic due to historic
factors; countries have chosen different development paths.5 Political and economic
development paths are furthermore interwoven. While some countries embarked upon
development paths that were associated with both democracy and economic growth,
others pursued a path based on dictatorships, repression and more limited economic
4See also Boix (2003).
5Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), point at differences in colonization strategies as an
important determinant for different development paths of colonial societies. For other studies that
point at the impact of certain historical factors see e.g. Jones (2003) and Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2002).
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growth (Acemoglu et al., 2008, 836).6
The literature review so far, illustrates that the income-democracy debate has
been dominated by a one-sided hypothesis. Researchers have either supported the
modernization theory or argued that there is no effect of income on democracy. Fayad,
Bates and Hoeﬄer (2012) on the other hand, find a negative effect of income on
democracy for inconsistent regimes (i.e. countries that are neither democratic nor
autocratic). This finding is furthermore robust against controlling for country specific
factors and simultaneity. The researchers also point out that Acemoglu et al. (2008)
report negative income effects but fail to comment upon them as such.7 Fayad et al.
(2012) furthermore find that it is the resource proportion of income per capita that
is negatively and significantly related to democracy. Using a pooled mean estimator
they also find that the long term effect of increased income is a drop in democracy.
Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005, 78), argue, in sharp contrast to
the modernization theory, that economic development strengthens autocracies in the
short term. They claim that authoritarian regimes have learned to use economic de-
velopment to their advantage. By increasing investments in public goods such as
public transportation, national defense, primary education and health care, the rulers
become more popular with the population. At the same time the rulers prevent in-
vestments in coordination goods, which make it hard for the population to coordinate
themselves and challenge the ruling regime. In particular, coordination is prevented
by limiting political rights, general human rights, press freedom and the population’s
access to higher education. In this way the autocratic leaders increase their probability
of survival. China and Russia are illustrative examples of countries where economic
development cannot be said to have triggered democratization. They are furthermore
examples of countries where the ruling regime strictly limit coordination goods by
monitoring media coverage and strongly penalizing criticism towards the regime.
2.2 Is there an economic growth curse?
In a broader perspective, higher income has in many studies been found to be dam-
aging for development. Take for instance the literature on the natural resource curse.
6Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2011) argue that a weakness in the Acemoglu et al. (2008) study is
that they do not account for relative importance of income. Using the same data as Acemoglu et al.
(2008), they find a significant but non-linear effect of income on democracy even after controlling for
country-specific effects. There is a positive effect of income in poor countries, but this effect vanishes
as countries become wealthy.
7See e.g. Acemoglu et al.’s (2008) table 3 columns 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9. Several of these estimates
are furthermore statistically significant. The conclusion in this paper however, is that income does
not affect democracy.
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It refers to the paradox that many natural resource abundant countries have lower
economic growth than resource-poor countries (Sachs and Warner, 2001).8 One of
the common explanations given for the curse is that rent-seeking elites in resource
abundant countries often divert a large portion of the resource revenues to themselves.
They are able to do so because of weak, ineffective and corrupt institutions. Further-
more, resource abundant countries often see a decline in the competitiveness of other
economic sectors. This is also labeled the Dutch disease.9
The resource curse has also been linked up to foreign aid. Natural resources and
foreign aid revenues are both windfalls, in the sense they are almost exogenous to the
economy. This makes it easier for corrupt politicians to grab resources for personal use,
without having to resort to unpopular (and often less profitable) means like taxation
(Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008, 4). Accordingly, Boone (1996, 322)
finds that foreign aid has no effect on economic growth nor investments in developing
countries. Burnside and Dollar (2000) modify this finding some. They argue that
aid can have a positive effect on growth and investments if the institutional quality
is high. In countries without good fiscal, monetary and trade policies however, aid
transfers are found to have little effect. Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008),
link the aid curse directly up to democratic quality. They argue that politicians’ rent-
seeking behavior is hampering for democracy because it gives them an incentive to
weaken the political institutions. The reason is that weak institutions are a a necessary
condition for the elite to be able to grab foreign aid for personal use. Furthermore,
when revenues do not depend on taxes from the citizens, there is less incentive for
democratic accountability. The corrupt government official will also try to sustain
their rent-seeking activity by reducing the probability of losing power. All these factors
are hampering for democracy (Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008, 5-6).
Accordingly, several studies find general economic growth, i.e. not only growth
connected to natural resources and aid, to negatively affect democracy. Epstein et al.
(2006) for instance, find that higher economic growth within a year decreases the
probability democratization. However, in a Markov analysis, they find that this result
only holds for countries that started out as autocracies (Ibid, 560). Kennedy (2010,
792-793) accordingly finds that GDP per capita growth within a year decreases the
probability of general institutional change. This indicates that economic growth has
a positive effect on the stability of both authoritarian and democratic regimes.10
8See also Gelb (1988), Sachs and Warner (1999) and Auty (2001).
9The resource curse has also been linked to a higher probability of conflict (see e.g. Collier and
Hoeﬄer (2005), Le Billon (2001) and Colgan (2013)).
10This is in accordance with findings from the economic crises literature (see e.g. Gasiorowski
(1995) and Geddes (1999)). Here economic crises are found to be destabilizing for both democratic
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This literature review has illustrated that the income-democracy literature is domi-
nated by a one-sided hypothesis. Researches either support Lipset’s (1959) moderniza-
tion theory, or argue that income does not have a causal effect on democracy. Fayad,
Bates and Hoeﬄer (2012) however, find economic level to have a negative effect on
democracy in inconsistent regimes. This is consistent with findings from the curse
literature that emphasize that economic growth in certain instances can have a ham-
pering effect on development. Fayad, Bates and Hoeﬄer (2012) however, do not offer
a theoretical explanation for why income can have a hampering effect on democracy.
This makes the story less credible, especially in a field dominated by the one-sided
hypothesis described above. Thus, in the next section I develop a simple theoretical
model which illustrates one possible mechanism that can link income negatively to
democracy. The model demonstrates how income growth changes the players’ incen-
tives. In particular, it illustrates that rent-seeking elites get an increased incentive to
push for autocracy following economic growth. This underlying logic is similar to the
arguments in the article by Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008), who find
that aid transfers can hamper democratic development.
and autocratic leaders. The mirroring argument from this debate is that positive economic growth




In this chapter I develop the theoretical framework for this thesis. Readers should note
that the model is not a complete or general theory about the link between income and
democracy. Not even close. The objective of the theoretical framework is simply to
demonstrate that a positive effect of income on democracy is not a law of nature. In
order to do so, I formalize one possible mechanism (out of many) that can explain
a negative short term effect of higher income on democracy. Thus, the theoretical
model only captures some aspects of a dynamic and complex process. Consequently,
the model conclusion only holds everything else being equal.
3.1 Introduction
For this thesis I post the following working hypothesis: In the short term, higher
income in a country can come with risk of less democracy, everything else being equal.
I base my claim on four simple observations, which I will take for granted throughout:
First, most individuals derive utility from economic wealth, in particular when that
wealth accrues to themselves. Second, economic wealth seems to be a limited resource
in the sense that not everyone can have unlimited wealth simultaneously. Third,
virtually any human societies, in particular countries, are organized hierarchically.
Those at the top of the hierarchy are in some cases controlled by the people through
democratic processes such as elections. In other cases these leaders secure their power
using brute force, or by buying off government officials. In any case, an arguably small
group of people is placed at the very top of most societies. In some political systems
this group has a disproportional large influence of the distribution of wealth. Fourth,
the wealth seems to be more equally distributed (between leaders and the rest) in
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democratic countries compared to autocratic ones.1
These observations lead quite naturally to the working hypothesis stated above.
The first two observations imply some sort of a tradeoff between different groups of
people when it comes to wealth. In particular, the struggle for economic wealth is
not totally different from a null sum game, where someone’s income gain is someone
else’s income loss.2 When adding the third observation (that societies are organized
hierarchically), one realizes that there is a potential tension between the leaders of a
society and the rest. In many countries this tension is of limited relevance. These
countries typically have high quality legal systems, deep democratic traditions, and so
on. In others, diverting publicly owned resources for private use is much easier, making
the expected return of such behavior high.3 The ruling elite in this latter group of
countries have especially much to gain when income is high, as this implies there is
more to grab. This is consistent with the fourth observation. Thus, higher income
as a result of economic growth, increases the incentive for the ruling elite to divert
resources for personal use. For that reason they should be willing to take stronger
measures to secure power when income is high. Those measures can include a number
of non-democratic actions, for example bribes to officials, to interest groups among
the people, or violent suppression of oppositional groups. It should also be said that
higher national income means that the public looses more when the elite diverts all
the resources. Still, a wealthy autocrat can afford to spend considerable resources to
please potential opponents, and he has more to loose by not doing so. Saudi Arabia
following the Arab spring is a good example of this. Here, the leaders had both the will
and economic power to invest strategically in public goods during the Arab Spring.
They also remained in power relatively effortless compared to their colleagues in e.g.
Libya and Syria.
Motivated by an econometric concern for unit roots in the time series, this thesis
analyzes empirically the effect of economic growth (first difference of logged income
level) on democratic development (first difference of democracy level).4 However, the
underlying theory is about level effects. This is justified by two observations: First,
the relationship between economic growth and democratic development on the one
1It could of course be discussed whether this is a cause or an effect of the regime type. See e.g.
Boix (2003).
2Strictly speaking it does not have to be a null sum game. However, there is always potential for
distributional conflicts.
3One cannot disregard the working hypothesis based on the observation that rich, western countries
are more democratic than others. These countries differ in many other aspects than the income level.
This is why the end of the working hypothesis, “everything else being equal”, is so important.
4The problem of unit roots and why first differencing controls for the problem is discussed in detail
in sections 4.3 and 6.2.
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hand, and between economic income level and the level of democracy on the other,
should be qualitatively similar. To see why, consider the linear equation yit = βxit−1.
The first difference is ∆yit = β∆xit−1, where the coefficient in the second equation is,
by definition, identical to the one in the first equation. Thus, if the first equation is
true, one can always estimate the second and obtain the same result. In other words,
whenever the growth rate is positive in this example, the level has to rise by definition.
Second, income growth matters to people only because it raises the income level. The
growth rate does not give utility per se. Analyzing the growth rate based on a theory
about income levels is fairly standard in the literature, in particular the literature on
economic growth (see e.g. Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965)).
The purpose of the econometric part of this thesis is to test whether statistical
results are consistent with the story portrayed above. Next I formalize the arguments
made so far in a stylized model of autocracy. The constructed model is undoubtedly
simple. It does however, clearly illustrate a possible mechanism that can link income
negatively to democracy in the short term.
3.2 A simple model of autocracy
Consider a country with a population of size n who discounts the future at a rate δ.
The population can be divided into two types of players, the elite (who governs the
country) and citizens (the remaining population). The number of elite members is
normalized to 1, so that the citizen group consists of n − 1 individuals. A change of
government implies that one individual is drawn from the pool of citizens to replace
the existing elite.
I assume that the country can be in two different states, democracy and autocracy.
Furthermore, both the elite and the citizens can either accept the current state or
try to push the country into the other state. Whether players prefer democracy or
autocracy depends on expected utilities in the two states. In a democracy, national
income y is divided equally among all members of the population, and everybody
(including the elite) get the same share y
n
of total income.5 This amount is referred
to as per capita national income. When the regime is autocratic, I assume that the
elite gets to keep the entire income net of a transfer κe that satisfies κe ≥ κe, where
κe is a positive constant. The transfer is handed out to the citizens, and captures the
5This can be thought of as the outcome of perfect competition among political candidates. Utility
maximizing citizens always prefer the candidate that promises more distribution of income to each
voter, so the only way to get elected is by transferring yn to each voter. Any other income sharing
would imply that some political candidate could suggest a different sharing and be elected on that
political platform.
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notion that every individual needs at least some income in order to survive.6 More
generally, κe represents any cost that is specific to the ruling elite in an autocracy, e.g.
corruption payments, expenditures on extra security measures, etc. Therefore κe will
be a choice variable for the elite that needs to be solved for (the elite will set κe in
order to maximize its own utility). Furthermore, I make the assumption that citizens
pay an additional cost κc > 0 if they choose to oppose the ruling elite in an autocratic
regime. This cost represents the disutility related to public repression of individuals,
personal losses in civil war, etc.
Suppose the elite, the essential player in the game, is the one that can initiate
an attempt to replace democracy by autocracy. As long as the elite chooses not to
do so, the country remains democratic. If on the other hand, the elite pushes for
autocracy, the citizens have to either a) try to overthrow the elite (possibly using
violent measures) and re-establish democracy, or b) accept the autocratic elite and
save the costs of opposition. When democracy is re-established after an autocratic
regime, the elite is eliminated by the citizens (who then choose a new government)
and gets zero utility forever after.
First, consider a democracy where the elite accepts the state of the country, i.e. it
does not try to establish autocracy. Then everyone including the elite get the same
share y
n
of total income. Thus, in an everlasting democracy the discounted lifetime
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n(1− δ) . (3.1)
The last line follows from (A.3) in Appendix A.
In order to proceed I make the assumption that changes in income are persistent,
so that any one-time increase or decrease in y is expected to last forever.7 This
assumption simplifies the analysis considerably because it implies that all future elites
(in expected terms) will try to achieve autocracy, given that it is preferable today.
To see this, suppose the current y is such that the elite finds autocracy optimal and
therefore tries to introduce autocracy. Suppose this attempt is overthrown so the
country becomes democratic again. Then the new elite will make the same analysis as
6Assume that citizens are responsible for production in the country. If κe < κe, then the citizens
die of hunger and production becomes y = 0. That can never be optimal for the elite as it would get
zero income (which is less than it gets in a democracy) in this case. Therefore, the elite will always
give something to the citizens.
7This is consistent with empirical analyses which suggest that log GDP is close to a random walk.
This assumption is furthermore supported by unit root tests of the variable in my dataset. See section
6.2 for more details.
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the previous one. Obviously, without any change in y also the new elite finds it optimal
to implement autocracy, and it will immediately try to do so. More generally, if y is
such that a party finds autocracy (democracy) optimal today, then the persistence in
y implies that this party is expected to always find autocracy (democracy) optimal.
Now, suppose the elite finds it optimal to establish autocracy. A relevant question
then is whether one can prevent the citizens to rise against the elite. In other words,
can the elite secure its leadership in an autocratic state? To answer this question,
remember that citizens in autocracy get a transfer κe from the autocratic elite. If they















n(1− δ) . (3.2)
However, if the citizens try to prevent autocracy, the outcome becomes uncertain. Let
any attempt to implement autocracy against the will of citizens, but also to keep it from
one period to the next, succeed with probability p.8 The corresponding probability
that citizens are able to prevent autocracy is 1−p (given that they oppose it).9 When
citizens rise against the autocratic elite, they also face a cost κc due to repression
from the rulers. Furthermore, in that case the elite should never transfer more than
the minimum amount κe = κe (they gain nothing by increasing the transfer). The
individual citizen’s expected utility when citizens rise against the autocratic elite,
















































n(1− δ) . (3.3)
Comparing (3.2) to (3.3) it is clear that citizens accept an autocratic state if UBC ≥ UAC ,
8Thus, the probability that the autocracy will survive for two periods (after implementation) is
p2, for three periods p3, etc.
9I make the simplifying assumption that p is independent of income. In reality however, this is
most likely not the case, see e.g.Boix (2003).










κe ≥ (1− p)y + p(κe − κc) (3.4)
Intuitively, when growth is positive so that y rises, it becomes more difficult to buy
off the citizens as their alternative cost (the utility in democracy) then increases. The
result implies that the citizens prefer autocracy when growth is sufficiently negative so
that the income level declines below the critical value in (3.4). Equation (3.4) can be
thought of as a participation constraint for the citizens that need to hold if the elite
is to ensure autocracy. The analysis is summarized so far in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. When income growth is positive, citizens require a higher transfer
from the elite to accept autocracy.
I have assumed throughout that n, p and δ are exogenous. It is however reasonable
to allow κe to be endogenous. In particular, one might think that the elite sets κe
in order to maximize its utility in autocracy. In order to solve for κe, suppose that
the elite decides to implement autocracy and at the same time pay the citizens so
that they accept this decision. The lifetime utility for the autocratic elite in this case,





= (y − κe) + δ(y − κe) + δ2(y − κe) + . . .
= (y − κe)
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1− δ . (3.5)
When is this outcome better for the elite than democracy? Comparing (3.5) to (3.1)















However, for this to be an equilibrium also (3.4) has to hold. Notice that it is sufficient
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for the elite to let (3.4) hold with equality to secure an autocratic state (this makes
the citizens indifferent between accepting autocracy and opposing it). Thus, they will
pay κe = (1− p)y + p(κe − κc). Inserting this into (3.6) and solving for y we get
y >
n
n− 1 [(1− p)y + p(κe − κc)]
n− 1− n(1− p)
n− 1 y >
pn
n− 1(κe − κc)
y >
pn
pn− 1(κe − κc). (3.7)
An important result immediately arises. Whenever (3.7) holds the elite prefers autoc-
racy with transfers to democracy, and the citizens accept this claim. This leads way
to the main hypothesis of this thesis, namely Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. When income growth is sufficiently positive so that (3.7) becomes
satisfied, then the equilibrium regime is not democratic.
Next, suppose the elite prefers an autocratic state and that the citizens choose to
oppose it. Even if autocracy is implemented, it will eventually be overthrown. The
expected length of an autocracy in this case is p + p2 + p3 + . . . = p
1−p . When the
autocracy is overthrown, the elite is eliminated by the citizens who choose a new elite.
Remember that the autocratic elite should never transfer more than κe = κe when
citizens are in opposition. Accordingly, the elite’s expected discounted utility in this





= p(y − κe) + δp2(y − κe) + δ2p3(y − κe) + . . .
= p(y − κe)
[
1 + δp+ δ2p2 + . . .
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1− pδ . (3.8)
When will the elite prefer autocracy with an opposing citizen group to democracy?
Comparing (3.1) and (3.8), we see that the elite prefers autocracy if UAE > U
D
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pn(1− δ)− (1− pδ)κe. (3.9)
Thus, the higher the income, the stronger incentive will the elite have to enforce
autocracy. In particular, if national income is sufficiently high so that equation (3.9)
holds, then the ruling elite will try to convert the country into autocracy. Notice that
the existence of an opposition to the autocratic elite implies that the country will be
autocratic with probability p, and democratic with probability 1 − p. This holds for
every period, so a country in this situation will move back and forth between autocracy
and democracy. Proposition 3 summarizes the result:
Proposition 3. When income growth is sufficiently positive so that (3.9) becomes
satisfied, then the elite prefers autocracy with risk of being overthrown by the opposition
to democracy.
The analysis so far has derived two conditions, namely equations (3.7) and (3.9),
that are sufficient to move a regime away from democracy. That is, as long as at
least one of the two conditions are satisfied, democracy cannot be an equilibrium. The
reason is that the elite, motivated by the potential income award, will try to impose
autocracy. However, even though (3.9) is satisfied, it does not mean that the elite
will choose the autocratic regime with opposition. That is, even if (3.9) is satisfied,
it does not imply that Proposition 3 represents an equilibrium. To fully characterize
equilibrium we need to determine whether the elite can prefer autocracy with transfers
to autocracy with opposition. Evidently it does so whenever UBE > U
A
E . Substituting







To check whether UBE > U
A
E can be a solution we insert for (3.4) into the left hand
side and then solve for y. The result is

























(1− δ)(1− pδ) > κe
δ(1− p)
(1− δ)(1− pδ) − κc
1
1− δ
y > κe −
1− pδ
δ(1− p)κc (3.10)
Now we are ready to revisit the question of whether Proposition 3 represents an equi-
librium or not. Notice that the right hand side of (3.9) satisfies
pn(1− δ)
pn(1− δ)− (1− pδ)κe > κe,
while the right hand side of (3.10) satisfies
κe −
1− pδ
δ(1− p)κc < κe.
Thus, whenever (3.9) holds, so will (3.10). The conclusion is that the elite will always
prefer to buy off the citizens to risking opposition, given that they prefer autocracy to
democracy in the first place. Combining results, we get Proposition 4, a refinement of
Proposition 2:
Proposition 4. When income growth is sufficiently positive so that
y >
pn
pn− 1(κe − κc),
then the equilibrium regime is autocratic. Under this condition the elite will pay a
transfer
κe = (1− p)y + p(κe − κc)
to the citizens, who will accept the autocracy. The expected lifetime utility of the elite
and the citizens are then given by
UBE =
py − p(κe − κc)
1− δ and U
B
C =
(1− p)y + p(κe − κc)
n(1− δ) respectively.
If the condition above does not hold, then the equilibrium regime is democratic. In that






In summary, a simple model which predicts that positive income growth might lead
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to a regime shift from democracy to autocracy has been established. The main idea
in this thesis is to test whether this prediction is consistent with data. Before the
econometric analysis can be performed however, the methods and data applied must




To test whether income affects democracy in the data, I estimate a linear regression
model. This chapter presents and discusses the econometric framework that underlies
the empirical analysis. First, I present the standard assumptions that are needed
for the estimates and inference to be valid. Second, I review the problem of time
series persistence in the variables. Third, I discuss the simultaneity problem. Finally,
two different instrumental variables estimators are suggested to take simultaneity into
account.
4.1 Introduction
I will use econometric methods to investigate the causal effect of income on democracy.
To fix ideas, consider the following dynamic and linear panel data model:
yit = β0 + β1xit−1 +
K∑
k=1
γkckit−1 + uit, where (4.1)
uit = αi + εit
For each country i in period t, yit denotes the dependent variable democracy, xit−1
is economic level (lagged by one period), and ckit−1 denotes control variable k ∈
[1, . . . , K]. uit is a residual term. In panel data, it is typically assumed that the
residual term can be decomposed into a constant panel-specific factor αi and a white
noise residual εit ∼ IID(0, σ2ε).1 The coefficients β0, β1, and {γk}Kk=1 are unobserved
population parameters to be estimated. β1 is the main parameter of interest, as it
represents the effect on yit of a marginal change in xit−1. Estimation of equation (4.1)
1IID(0, σ2ε) denotes that the variable is independent and identically distributed, with mean zero
and constant variance (denoted by σ2ε).
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by ordinary least squares (OLS) methods will yield unbiased estimates and correct
inference only if a number of assumptions are met (Wooldridge, 2009, 105, 503-505).
The set of assumptions is reported below:
(A1) For each panel i, the regression equation is linear in the parameters. That is,
equation (4.1) represents the true population model.
(A2) Random sampling, i.e. the data sample is representative for the underlying
population.
(A3) There are no perfect linear relationships between the explanatory variables, i.e.
no collinearity.
(A4) The expected value of the residual uit is zero, conditional upon all the explana-
tory variables: E(uit|xit−1, {ckit−1}Kk=1) = 0.
(A5) The residual uit displays constant conditional variance σ
2
u: V ar(uit|xit−1) = σ2u.
This is referred to as no heteroskedasticity.
(A6) There is no autocorrelation in the residuals: Cov(uit, uit−1) = 0.
Assumption (A1) is a trivial implication of estimating and making inference based on a
linear model. One should note however, that xit−1 always has the same marginal effect
on yit in a linear model, regardless of the initial value of xit−1. Assumption (A2) is also
quite simple. Needless to say, the data used for inference should reflect the population.
I discuss potential problems with missing data in chapter 5. Assumption (A3) of no
collinearity is needed to identify the regression parameters. However, the correlation
matrix Table B.3 in appendix B leaves little room for concerns about multicollinearity
problems in this analysis. The key assumption is (A4). This assumption implies two
things. First it implies that none of the explanatory variables in equation (4.1) co-vary
with the residual, i.e. that
Cov(xit−1, uit) = Cov(c1it−1, uit) = . . . = Cov(cKit−1, uit) = 0.
Second it implies that the expected unconditional residual is zero, i.e. that
E(uit) = 0.
These two restrictions are crucial. To see this, consider a simple version of equation
(4.1) without control variables (these are abstracted from for the moment to ease the
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notation):
yit = β0 + β1xit−1 + uit
β1, the population parameter of interest in this equation, can be expressed as follows





The OLS estimator on the other hand, denoted βˆ1 can be derived as




When comparing (4.2) and (4.3), we see that the OLS estimator is unbiased only if
Cov(xit−1, uit) = 0. This is the sense in which assumption (A.4) is crucial for the
regression results to be valid.
If assumptions (A1)-(A4) are met, then estimation of (4.1) by means of OLS yields
unbiased estimates of the parameters in the model. If assumptions (A5)-(A6) hold,
then estimation of (4.1) by means of OLS yields unbiased standard errors as well. I try
to take these two latter requirements into account by estimating Huber-White robust
standard errors clustered around countries. The rest of this chapter presents strategies
that aim at fulfilling (A.4).
4.2 Fixed-effects regression
A concern when using country-year data is that country-specific factors which do
not vary over time, affect explanatory variables as well as the dependent variable.
Theoretically it can exist a vast number of such factors, making it impossible to include
them all in the estimated model. The sum of all country-specific factors that do not
vary over time is represented in equation (4.1) by αi. From this equation we realize
that (A.4) is satisfied only if
E(αi|xit−1, {ckit−1}Kk=1) = 0,
which implies that the fixed effect αi must be uncorrelated with all the explanatory
variables. This is unlikely. For instance, geographical location might affect both a
country’s level of democracy and its economic level. If this is the case, then leav-
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ing geographical location out of the regression equation (4.1) might lead to omitted
variable bias. However, country-specific factors can be controlled for by means of the
fixed-effects estimator (Verbeek, 2008, 359). One approach is to include a dummy
variable for each country i. However, this substantially reduces the degrees of freedom
as the number of regressors increases. Transforming the data prior to the estima-
tion to eliminate αi all together is therefore an easier way to control for the problem
(Wooldridge, 2009, 481). Again, consider equation (4.1), this time without control
variables and with the decomposed error term:
yit = β0 + β1xit−1 + αi + εit (4.4)
Remember that αi is the constant country-specific factor while εit is the white noise
residual. For country i, the average of this equation over time is
y¯i = β0 + β1x¯i + αi + ε¯i, (4.5)
where y¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1 yit, x¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1 xit and ε¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1 εit denote the (time)
demeaned variables. Because αi is constant over time, it is present in both equations
(4.4) and (4.5).2 The fixed-effects transformation implies subtracting equation (4.5)
from equation (4.4). For each t the transformation gives
yit − y¯i = β1(xit−1 − x¯i) + εit − ε¯i (4.6)
It is evident in equation (4.6) that the unobserved country-specific effect αi has dis-
appeared. Also, assumption (A.4) is now reduced to
E
(
(εit − ε¯i) | (xit−1 − x¯i) , {ckit−1 − c¯ki}Kk=1
)
= 0.
Accordingly, equation (4.6) can now be estimated consistently by ordinary least squares
methods (given that εit is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables) (Wooldridge,
2009, 482). This is the sense in which the fixed-effects estimator allows arbitrary
correlation between αi and the explanatory variables.
3 The parameters in fixed effects
regressions are identified only through the within dimension of the data (Verbeek,
2008, 362). However, when interpreting the results, it is important to realize that the
2Note that α¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1 αi = αi.
3Note that variables that do not vary over time, such as colonial past, cannot be included in
fixed-effects regressions as these are transformed away.
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linearity of the model allows us to interpret coefficients in exactly the same way as the
OLS estimates.
Factors that are time specific, but do not vary across countries, might also affect de-
mocratization and explanatory variables simultaneously. I will control for such factors
by including time dummy variables in the regression equations, effectively estimating
time fixed-effects regressions.
Running fixed-effects regressions sometimes comes at the cost of considerable loss
of variation in the data, since the between dimension of the data is removed. Less
variation leads to higher estimated standard errors, making it harder to prove signif-
icant relationships (Green, Kim and Yoon, 2001). A Hausman specification test can
give an indication of whether fixed effects should be controlled for. It tests’ whether
estimates from one estimator are significantly different from another (Hausman, 1978).
H0 being that the estimates do not differ systematically from each other. First, I com-
pare the estimates from an OLS estimator and a fixed-effects estimator that controls
for country-specific effects. Systematic estimate difference is likely to be the result of
the latter controlling for country-specific effects while the former does not. The null
of no systematic estimate difference is rejected at any reasonable significance level,
p-value being 0.0002. Furthermore, when comparing an OLS estimator with a fixed-
effects estimator that controls for time, the null is also rejected, p-value being 0.0000.
Consequently, both country and time fixed effects will be controlled for in the main
analysis.
4.3 Time series persistence
In time series models, one is typically concerned with possible non-stationarity in the
variables and so-called unit roots. These data features lead to biased estimates if
not taken into account (Wooldridge, 2009, 393). This section explains the unit root
problem and suggest how one can deal with the issue. Consider an autoregressive
process of order one (an AR(1)):
xit = ρxit−1 + uxit (4.7)
xit is the variable’s value in period t while ρ is an autoregressive coefficient assumed
to take a value from zero to one. uxit ∼ IID(0, σ2u) is a white noise residual. Equation
(4.7) is said to contain unit root if ρ = 1. In this case the time series is typically
refereed to as a random walk process. To illustrate the implications of a unit root, I
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where the last line follows from the assumption that xi0 = 0. Equation (4.8) states
that the value on x in period t, xit, is equal to a weighted sum of all past shocks, where
the shock j periods ago is denoted uxit−j. The weight on u
x
it−j is ρ
j. This equation has
a number of implications. First, it demonstrates that the effect of an increase in uxit−j
by one unit implies an increase in xit by ρ
j units. Second, that effect is higher when ρ
is a higher number.4 Thus, a higher value on ρ implies that shocks to ux take longer
time before they die out (implying persistence in the series). Third, if ρ = 1, then
shocks never die out. To see this, note that ρ = 1 implies that equation (4.7) becomes
xit = xit−1 + uxit (4.9)





The last result follows from the observation that ρj = 1 for any j whenever ρ = 1.
If ρ = 1 (unit root), then inclusion of xit in regression models can result in biased
estimates. To see why, note that estimation involves the calculation of moments such
as the mean and the variance, e.g. E(xit) and V ar(xit). The mean is found by taking














4As an example, suppose j = 2 and compare the cases ρ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.1. The former gives
ρj = 0.52 = 0.25 while the latter gives ρj = 0.12 = 0.01.
5See e.g. Wooldridge (2009, 724-728) for details on how to derive the mean and the variance.
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The last equality follow from the assumption that the white noise residual uxit has
mean zero. The variance is derived from (4.10) and our finding that E(xit) = 0:
6






















Clearly this expression depends on time. In fact, it increases as a linear function of j,
and goes to infinity as j →∞. Thus, if ρ = 1 in (4.7) then the variance of xit is not well
defined, and the constant variance assumption that panel data estimators are based
upon is violated. Failing to take this into account will yield biased estimates, and this
is the problem of including a unit root series in the regression model (Wooldridge,
2009, 393).
To test for a unit root in (4.7), one can do the following: Subtract xit−1 on both
sides to get
∆xit = xit − xit−1 = (ρ− 1)xit−1 + uxit = ρxxit−1 + uxit,
where ρx = ρ − 1. Note that ρx = 0 if ρ = 1, and that ρx < 0 if ρ < 1. Thus, one
can simply estimate this equation by OLS, and test the null hypothesis that ρx = 0
versus the alternative ρx < 0. Presence of unit roots in the time-series for income
and democracy is tested for in section 6.2. There I find evidence of a unit root in
both series. To take this into account, I follow standard procedure and use the first
difference of the variables. Then equation (4.7) becomes ∆xit = u
x
it, implying that the
unit root series has been transformed into a stationary white noise process. I do the
same transformation on both income and democracy. Consequently, it is the effect
of economic growth on changes in democracy that will be estimated in the empirical
analysis.7
4.4 Reversed causality
Reversed causality (simultaneity) is a sub-category of the endogenity problem, which
implies that one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error
term. There is simultaneity in the data if at least one of the explanatory variables x
6The second last equality uses that the variance of a sum is equal to the sum of the variances as
long as the covariance between terms is zero.
7The first difference of income is the growth rate because the logarithm of income is being used.
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has an impact on the dependent variable y, at the same time as the dependent variable
y affects the explanatory variable x (Verbeek, 2008, 138). In particular, while it can be
argued that economic growth affects democratization, in accordance with the working
thesis presented here, it can also be claimed that democratization affects economic
growth. Egypt following the Arab spring illustrates the reversed causality between
economic growth and democratization. Following the revolution in January 2011, the
country experienced a sharp reduction in GDP growth rate to 1 percent in 2011 from
almost 5 percent in 2010 (Mishrif, 2012, 4).8 Accordingly, previous research indicates
that democratization reduces economic growth in the short term, while it stimulates
growth in a longer perspective (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). Democracies
often have more secured property rights, which may lead to more investments and
production, that further stimulates economic growth.9 Simultaneity between economic
growth and democratization can be illustrated in the following way:
Economic growth Democratization
If the data used in the analysis reflects such simultaneity, then the explanatory vari-
able is partly explained by variation in democracy, which is a violation of assumption
(A.4), i.e. that of exogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2009). If not controlled for, this
simultaneity problem implies that a standard OLS-analysis would generate biased esti-
mates that might lead to wrong policy conclusions. In section 7.3 I test for simultaneity
between income growth and democracy and find that it cannot be ruled out.
Several previous studies have attempted to address the simultaneity problem by
using lagged economic growth (or level) as explanatory variable (e.g. Muller (1995),
Barro (1999)). By lagging the economic growth variable, it is determined that the
growth occurred before the democratization. However, in order for this approach to
fix the simultaneity problem, one must assume that economic actors cannot anticipate
8Several factors related to the revolution, can explain the reduced growth. Egypt experienced
reduced tourism, FDI inflows and export revenues. As a result of inadequate response to these
challenges Egypt has furthermore seen a sharp increase in inflation and unemployment (Mishrif,
2012, 5).
9Accordingly, the results from an extremely simple regression analysis (no control variables) using
the dataset I have constructed for this thesis, indicate that democratization (positive change in
democracy) has a negative effect on economic growth (coefficient: - 0.139, t-value: - 2.05), while
democratic level seems to have a positive effect on growth (coefficient: 0.068, t-value: 2.94). These
results however, are no longer significant when country and time fixed effects are controlled for.
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democratization and adjust their behavior accordingly. This is a very strong assump-
tion. Regime change is often the result of a gradual change in the society, which
implies that economic actors can foresee the regime change and adjust their behav-
ior accordingly. Hence, using a lagged economic growth variable does not provide a
convincing solution to the simultaneity problem.
In this thesis I use an instrumental variables strategy to address simultaneity be-
tween economic growth and democratization. This approach controls for simultaneity
if the instruments chosen are exogenous. The instrumental variables estimators ap-
plied in the econometric analysis are reviewed next.
4.4.1 Two Stage Least Squares
Instrumental variables (IV) methods can be used to solve endogeneity problems of
one or more of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2009, 506). Here, instrumental
variables are used to obtain exogenous variation in the explanatory variable. The
exogenous variation is then used to establish a causal effect on the dependent variable.
Two fix things, we once again consider equation (4.1) without controls:
yit = β0 + β1xit−1 + uit
As simultaneity between yit and xit−1 implies Cov(xit−1, uit), i.e. violation of (A.4), the
standard OLS estimator cannot be used. The two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator
instead takes as point of departure an auxiliary regression model:
xit = φ0 + φ1zit + rit (4.11)
Here, xit is the explanatory variable that is vulnerable to simultaneity in equation
(4.1), while zit is a so-called instrument variable. φ0 and φ1 are parameters to be
estimated, and rit ∼ IID(0, σ2r) is a white noise residual. Equation (4.11) is typically
referred to as the first stage model, for reasons that will become clear in a second. In
principle the 2SLS procedure amounts to:
1. Estimate equation (4.11) in order to obtain predicted values for xit, labeled xˆit.
2. Estimate yit = β0 + β
iv
1 xˆit−1 + uit, where xˆit−1 are the predicted values from the
first stage regression and βiv1 denotes the (instrumented) parameter of interest.
These two stages have given rise to the name two stage least squares. One can show
that the 2SLS estimator, denoted βˆiv1 , is given by (see Wooldridge (2009, 510) for
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details):




When using the 2SLS estimator, global economic growth and climatic natural disasters
will be used to instrument (local) economic growth. Equation (4.12) tells us that there
are two requirements for an instrument to be valid:
1. The instrument z must be relevant in the sense that it is correlated with the
explanatory variable economic growth, i.e. Cov(zit, xit) 6= 0.
2. The instrument z must be exogenous to democratization in the sense that it is
uncorrelated with the error term u, i.e. Cov(zit−1, uit) = 0.
The first condition makes it possible to obtain variation in the explanatory variable,
and requires that φ1 6= 0 in (4.11). The second condition stresses that this variation
needs to be exogenous. In particular, (4.12) illustrates that Cov(zit−1, uit) = 0 is
a necessary condition for the 2SLS estimator to be unbiased. If the two conditions
above hold, then the instrumented variation can be used to establish a causal effect
of economic growth on democratization.
Given the restrictions outlined above, the 2SLS method makes it possible to esti-
mate the causal effect from economic growth on democratization. Nevertheless, using
an instrument-variable approach is not unproblematic. If the instruments used are
weak, by either being correlated with the error term, or only being weakly correlated
with the endogenous explanatory variable, then 2SLS estimates can be worse than OLS
estimates (Wooldridge, 2009, 536). Furthermore, even when an IV approach is appro-
priate, 2SLS estimates always have higher variance than OLS estimates (Wooldridge,
2009, 523-524). The reason is that xˆ, by construction, has less variation than x. The
variation in x is the total sum of squares, while the variation in xˆ is only the explained
sum of squares from the first stage regression. This makes it more difficult to find sig-
nificant effects. The researcher therefore faces a tradeoff between efficient but possibly
biased OLS estimates, and inefficient, but unbiased 2SLS estimates.
4.4.2 Arellano-Bond GMM
By instrumenting economic growth in the 2SLS estimator, simultaneity between eco-
nomic growth and democratization is addressed. However, in the econometric analysis
regime duration, corruption, oil dependency, civil conflict onset, income inequality and
education level are included as controls to achieve more robust results. There might
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also be simultaneity between democratization and some of these control variables (e.g.
corruption, inequality, education). If simultaneity between one explanatory variable
and democratization is not controlled for, all regression estimates can be biased and
inconsistent (Verbeek, 2008, 140). Thus, for the estimated effect of economic growth
on democratization to be reliable, possible simultaneity problems for all explanatory
variables should be controlled for.
This could be achieved by instrumenting all the explanatory variables in a 2SLS
model. However, it is often challenging to find valid instruments for all variables.
Arellano and Bond (1991) have developed an alternative approach by constructing a
GMM estimator. They show that instruments can be obtained in a dynamic panel
data model if one utilizes independent (orthogonality) conditions that exist between
lagged values of the explanatory variable and the error term (Baltagi, 2008, 149). The
estimator was originally developed in a setting with lagged dependent variables as
controls. Although I do not have a lagged dependent variable, I will still use a similar
approach to identify a causal effect of economic growth. To see how, consider again
the dynamic linear model from (4.1) without controls:
yit = βxit−1 + uit
yit is democratization, xit−1 is lagged economic growth and needs to be instrumented,
and the error term is uit = αi + εit. As before, αi is the country fixed effect while
εit ∼ IID(0, σ2ε) is the white noise residual. By assuming a white noise residual we are
by assumption ruling out the possibility of serial correlation in levels. Now an auxiliary
assumption is made, namely that economic growth follows an AR(1) process10:
xit = ρxit−1 + νit, (4.13)
where |ρ| ∈ (0, 1). It is also assumed that νit ∼ IID(0, σ2ν) (white noise). When
inspecting equations (4.1) and (4.13), it is seen that the possible simultaneity between
xit−1 and yit in (4.1) can be accounted for by using xit−2 as an instrument. This
instrument is valid as long as ρ 6= 0.
In my case the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator can be derived as follows: First,
equation (4.1) is first differenced to eliminate country specific effects:
yit − yit−1 = β(xit−1 − xit−2) + (εit − εit−1) (4.14)
10An AR(1) process implies that there is first order serial correlation, i.e. the value of the variable
this year depends on the variables’ value last year.
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Now, constant country-specific effects are controlled for. In particular, the error term
only consists of the white noise residual (in first differences). However, the simultaneity
problem still remains unsolved. The first period in which an instrument variable can
be used is t = 4, where
yi4 − yi3 = β(xi3 − xi2) + (εi4 − εi3)
Here xi1 is a valid instrument because (4.13) tells us it is correlated with (xi3 − xi2).
At the same time, xi1 is not correlated with (εi4 − εi3) (as long as εit is not serially
correlated, which it by assumption is not). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) developed a
GMM instrumental variables estimator similar to this, in which only one lagged version
of the variable is used as an instrument. However, Arellano and Bover (1995) show
through Monte Carlo evidence that the Andersen-Hsiao estimator can have large biases
and large standard errors, especially when ρ is close to 1 (Verbeek, 2008, 379). What
Arellano and Bond (1991) argue is that the list of instruments should be extended by
exploiting additional moment conditions and let the number of instruments vary with
t (Verbeek, 2008, 380). To see how this works, consider the next period, t = 5. Here
we get
yi5 − yi4 = β(xi4 − xi3) + (εi5 − εi4)
Now, the autoregressive structure of (4.13) implies that both xi2 and xi1 are valid
instruments for (xi4 − xi3). To see that xi1 is a valid instrument, one can solve (4.13)
backwards from t = 3:
xi3 = ρxi2 + νi3 = ρ (ρxi1 + νi2) + νi3 = ρ
2xi1 + ρνi2 + νi3
Now we have an equation where xi3 is determined by both xi1 (the first term on the
right hand side) and xi2 (the second term on the right hand side). Furthermore, the
instruments are by assumption not correlated with (εi4 − εi3). This procedure can be
continued, adding an extra valid instrument with each forward period. Hence, in any
generic period t, the set of valid instruments is (xi1, xi2, . . . , xit−2) (Baltagi, 2008, 149).
The strength of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for this thesis is first and fore-
most that it addresses possible simultaneity problems between all the explanatory
variables and democratization. Furthermore constant country-specific effects are also
controlled for. However, a common concern raised by Windmeijer (2005) and others, is
that the method takes advantage of too many instruments, which can result in model
38
overfitting.11 A model that includes more instruments than variables that are instru-
mented is always overidentified. The question is whether the instruments strengthen
the estimation by adding relevant information. However, the Sargan and Hansen tests
are tests for overidentification. They are reported in the regression tables. I follow the
results from these tests when deciding upon how many instruments (lags) to include
in the Arellano-Bond GMM estimations. In that manner I reduce the probability of
overfitting the model.
In this chapter I have reviewed the estimators that will be applied in the main
analysis. Moreover, I have pointed out why time-series persistence and simultaneity
might be a problem, and reviewed possible solutions to these challenges. In the next
chapter I review the data used in the main analysis.
11Overfitting occurs when a statistical model describes random error or noise instead of the un-
derlying relationship. It often occurs when a model is excessively complex, by for instance including
too many instruments. Such a model often has poor predictive power, as it can exaggerate minor





In order to study the effect of economic growth on democratization, I have constructed
a dataset with observations on 168 countries from 1980-2007.1 Total number of obser-
vations is 4406. Raw data are taken from several datasets and the original sources are
cited when the variables are presented. The constructed dataset is unbalanced. This
implies that there are missing values for certain country-year observations. Potential
problems with an unbalanced panel are discussed in section 5.5.
In the rest of this chapter I describe the variables and the data. First, the democra-
tization measurement is reviewed. Second, I outline the measure for economic growth.
Third, the control variables are presented. Forth, I review descriptive statistics for all
variables included in the main analysis. Finally, potential challenges related to missing
data and measurement error are discussed.
5.1 Dependent variable: change in democracy
Yearly change in Polity2 is the dependent variable in the analysis. The Polity2 variable
is taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2012). Polity2 is an
index ranging from -10, denoting least democratic, to 10, denoting most democratic.
By taking the first difference of the variable, yearly changes in Polity2 is measured.2
Polity2 is the difference between a country’s score on the autocracy and democracy
indicator, which are also included in the Polity IV dataset. These indicators are de-
rived from codings on the following five dimensions. First, competitiveness of executive
recruitment. It refers to whether the chief executive is democratically elected or rather
11980-2007 will be the time-series for the main analysis. Hoverer as a robustness test of the results
the time-series will be extended.
2The variable is first differentiated because it cannot be ruled out that Polity2 contain unit root in
level. The challenge of unit roots and why first differencing the variable fixes the problem is discussed
in detail in section 4.3 and 6.2.
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selected based on heritage or designation. Second, openness of executive recruitment.
The process is coded as open if political active individuals have the opportunity (in
principle), to get elected through a regularized process. Third, constraints on the
chief executive. This concerns whether there are institutionalized constrains on deci-
sions taken by the executive. Forth, competitiveness of political participation. It refers
to whether citizens have the opportunity to express their preferences for alternative
policies and leadership in the political arena. For a country to be defined as having
political competition there must be a significant degree of civil interaction in the polit-
ical process. Finally, regulation of participation. Participation is coded as regulated if
there are binding rules for when, whether and how political preferences are expressed.3
The five dimensions that make up Polity2 are well suited for capturing the first
two criteria I defined as decisive for democracy in section 1.3. I repeat the criteria
here for convenience. i) There must be institutions and procedures through which
citizens can express their preferences about political leaders and alternative policies.
ii) There must be institutional constrains on the power of the executive. The third
criteria however, namely that iii) citizens must be guaranteed civil and political rights,
is not captured directly by the Polity2 variable. However, these factors are at least
to some extent measured indirectly. The reason is that citizens must have civil and
political rights for countries to obtain a high Polity2 score. For instance, without
political rights such as the right to vote and run for political office, one cannot have
competitive elections. Furthermore, without civil liberties such as freedom of expres-
sion and assembly, countries will get low scores on the competitiveness of political
participation dimension. Nevertheless, as a robustness test of the regression results,
the civil liberties and political rights index from Freedom House will be used as an
alternative dependent variable.
While it is a weakness that Polity2 does not directly incorporate codings on civil
liberties and political rights, Polity2 has some evident strengths. First of all, it has
good coverage. Second, as observable formal institutions are the main focus, different
biases related to the coders subjective judgment is reduced (Knutsen, 2011, 91). A
further strength with the Polity2 measure is its transparency. The Polity IV project
publish the indicator scores and have transparent weighing procedures (Munck and
Verkuilen, 2002, 19-20). This makes it possible to critically asses the reliability of
each component of the measure. It is a further strength that the five dimensions are
weighted differently based on “importance”. These strengths lead me to prefer the
Polity2 measure of democracy over other available measurements.
3See Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2011, 14-16,21-28) for more information about the dimensions
and how they are weighted.
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5.2 Explanatory variable: economic growth
The main explanatory variable in the analysis is short term economic growth. That is
the yearly growth rate in real GDP per capita (in terms of purchasing power parity).
The variable is constructed based on the economic level variable from Penn World
Table version 7.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2012). Economic growth is used over
economic level due to possible presence of unit roots in the time-series.4 Economic




This way of measuring economic growth is equivalent to taking the first difference of
logged economic level, see Wooldridge (2009, 393). The variable has been multiplied
by hundred to enable interpretation of the variable directly in percent points. I include
a lagged version of the variable in the regression as it is reasonable to assume that it
takes a while before economic growth affects democratization.5 I use real rather than
nominal GDP because it is measured in constant prices. This implies two things. First,
that real GDP is adjusted for changes in purchasing power over time within a country,
i.e. it has been adjusted for inflation.6 Second, that real GDP is adjusted for changes
in purchasing power across countries. Thus, purchasing power parity is adjusted for,
by taking into consideration that 100 dollars are worth more in a poor country than
it is in a rich one at a given time. The growth variable is furthermore measured in per
capita because interest lies in the country’s wealth rather than absolute GDP level.7
A central objective in this thesis is to address simultaneity between income growth
and democratization in a proper manner. Therefore, instruments are used to measure
the effect of short term economic growth on democratization. The 2SLS instruments
are reviewed next.
5.2.1 Instruments for the 2SLS estimator
Climatic natural disasters and global economic growth are used as instruments for (lo-
cal) economic growth in the 2SLS estimator. I have already reviewed the requirements
for an instrument to be valid, but repeat them here for convenience. First, the instru-
4See sections 4.3 and 6.2.
5All the control variables in the analysis are lagged for the same reason. The argument for using
lagged variables will not be repeated.
6Inflation is adjusted for by deflating GDP against prices in 2005 (which is the reference year).
7Penn World Table reports Real GDP based on different techniques. I use economic data that is
calculated with the Laspeyre 2 technique.
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ment must be relevant in the sense that it is correlated with economic growth. The
rule of thumb is that instruments with a t-value of 3 or higher are relevant (Staiger
and Stock, 1997). Second, the instrument must be exogenous to democratization, in
the sense that it is not correlated with the error term. In other words the instrument
cannot affect democratization through other factors than the variables included in the
regression model. While the first requirement can be tested for the second one cannot.
The Climatic natural disasters instrument stems from Bergholt and Lujala (2012).8
Bergholt and Lujala (2012) find that climatic natural disasters are a valid instrument
for economic growth for the whole world sample. The reason is that all types of
countries experience climatic natural disasters. Furthermore, climatic disasters are
expected to negatively affect economic growth, and therefore pick up variation in the
country’s economic growth. At the same time, it is very unlikely that climatic disasters
directly affect democratization in a given country. The researchers only include storms
and floods in their measure of climatic natural disasters, as these disasters typically
have rapid onsets and disappear within a month. This strengthens the instrument’s
exogenity.9 The researchers control for the fact that how a disaster affects national
income is likely to depend on both the magnitude of the disaster and time elapsed
since the event took place. Magnitude is accounted for by normalizing the size of
an event by dividing the size of the affected population by total country population.
Furthermore, a disaster event happening in January is likely to have a larger effect
on countries annual economic growth than an event happening in December, which
most likely will have a larger effect on the country’s growth the following year. To
address this problem, the researchers weigh the time elapsed since the event using the
devaluation rate (12− event monthjit)/12. Where j is natural disaster in country i in
year t.10
Figure 5.1 plots climatic natural disasters against economic growth. We see that
most country-year observations do not have a climatic disaster incidence. Furthermore,
observations with disaster incidences appear to have relatively low economic growth.
Thus, the instrument seems to pick up variation in economic growth. Whether it picks
up enough variation in economic growth however, will be revealed in the first stage of
the 2SLS regression.
8Original disaster data stems from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). For an event to
be included in the EM-DAT database it must meet one of the following criteria: 10 or more casualties,
100 or more people affected, deceleration of a state emergency, or call for international assistance.
9EM-DAT includes information of the number of people killed and people affected by the event.
Bergholt and Lujala (2012) use number of people affected as their main variable of interest.
10For more information about the instrument see Bergholt and Lujala (2012).
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I constructed the global economic growth instrument by taking the average global
growth rate each year, based on the economic growth variable reviewed in the previous
section. Global economic growth is a plausible instrument for growth in gross domestic
product because global growth is likely to affect countries’ economic growth. Business
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cycles across countries typically move together as they trade with each other, making
the instrument relevant. Furthermore, unlike national economic growth, it is hard to
see how global economic growth can have a direct impact on democratization in a given
country. Rather, it seems likely that global economic growth affects democratization
in a given country through its effect on the local economic growth. Figure 5.2 plots
global economic growth against countries economic growth. From the figure we see
that when global economic growth is low most countries have ”normal” local growth.
However, in country-years where global growth is high there are also some extreme
local economic growth observations.
5.3 Control variables
Control variables are included in the regression analysis for two reasons. First, to
explain variation in democracy. Second, to avoid omitted variable bias. I include a
number of controls that are widely used in the democratization literature.
First, I control for duration of the current regime. The count variable stems from
the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2012). The variable either counts
the number of years since the most recent regime change (defined as a three point
change in polity score within the three last years), or the number of years since the
end of a transition period (defined by the lack of stable political institutions) (Marshall,
Gurr and Jaggers, 2011, 17).11 Previous research indicates that regimes survival rate
increases with time. Svolik (2009, 479) for instance, finds that the likelihood that
a leader will be removed from office by a coup initially increases before it clearly
decreases after some time.
Second, I control for political corruption. Political corruption is defined as abuse
of public office for private gain (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).12 The annual political
corruption index is taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, ndb). It
ranges from 0 to 6, where 6 denotes a political system without political corruption.
The corruption index is based on codings on financial corruption, extensive patronage,
nepotism, job reservations, favor-for-favors, secret party funding and surprisingly close
ties between politics and business (ICRG, nda, 4-5).13 Hegre and Fjelde (2011), study
11When calculating the durable variable, the first year with a new polity is coded as the baseline
zero value. All subsequent years adds 1 to value of the variable (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2011,
17).
12For more nuanced definitions of the concept see Hegre and Fjelde (2011).
13ICRG corruption index is based on assessments by country experts. Thus, it is as all other
corruption data, subjective. The ICRG corruption measure is applied in this thesis because it has
the best coverage for cross-section time-series analysis (Hegre and Fjelde, 2011).
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the effect of political corruption on the probability of regime transition and regime
duration. They find that political corruption strengthens the durability of autocratic
and semi-autocratic regimes (Hegre and Fjelde, 2011, 4). Political leaders in such
regimes convert public resources into private privileges for some, and in that manner
build informal support. As a result the leaders increase their probability of survival,
and therefore also the regime’s durability.
Third, I control for oil as portion of GDP. The variable is taken from the World
Bank (2012). The variable is the difference between the value of crude oil production at
world prices and total costs of production. Previous research has argued that income
generated from natural resources such as oil, can create less pressure for democrati-
zation then income that stems from human and physical capital (Barro, 1999, 164).14
The reason is that governments become less indebted to the population when national
income stems from natural resources. Barro (1999, 165) accordingly finds that being
an oil exporting country has a negative effect on democracy. Hegre, Knutsen and Rød
(2012) on the other hand, do not find robust evidence for that abundance of natural
resources reduces the probability of democratization.
Fourth, I control for intrastate conflict. The onset of intrastate state conflict vari-
able originates from the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Themne´r and Wallensteen, 2012). It
is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 in all country-years with a new conflict or
if more than two years have passed since the last observation of the conflict. In both
cases there must have been at least 25 battle related deaths. Otherwise, the variable
takes the value 0. Conflict can be damaging for democratization. Collier (1999, 169)
points out that during conflict, civil liberties are often diminished while rule of law
breaks down. Military forces get increased power at the expense of the police and law
system. This can obviously be damaging for democratic institutions, at least in the
short run. Conflict can furthermore, have a devastating effect on economic growth,
through destruction of human life and capital (Collier, 1999, 169).
Fifth, I include investment share of GDP as a crude proxy for economic inequality.
To the extent that capital owners hold a major share of GDP, and at the same time
there are significant wealth differences between those who own capital and others,
the investment share of GDP can proxy relative wealth differences within a country.
The reason is that capital formation is achieved through investment.15 The variable
14See also Ross (2001).
15A substantial part of previous statistical research focusing on economic inequality uses the gini-
coefficient from Deininger and Squire (1996). A weakness with this measurement is poor data cover-
age. Time-series are short and many countries are not included. Capital share has also been used as
a measure for economic inequality. Though also a crude measure, it can be argued that capital share
is a stronger proxy for income equality than investment share because it also takes into consideration
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is taken from the Penn World Table 7.1 dataset (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2012).
Boix and Stokes (2003, 539) argue that democratization is not triggered by higher
economic level in itself. Instead, democratization is caused by other changes that
accompany development, particularly lower levels of income inequality. Their claim
is that the elite has less (little) to lose by democratizing when income equality is
high (Boix and Stokes, 2003, 539-540). The elite find a democratic tax structure less
expensive for them as the country becomes richer and are therefore more willing to
democratize. Boix and Stokes (2003, 540) find that higher levels of income equality
have a positive effect on democracy. Hegre, Knutsen and Rød (2012, 20) however,
do not find the income inequality (measured by the gini-index) to be systematically
related to democratization.
Sixth, I control for education. The original variable stems from the World Bank
(2012). The variable is the total number of students enrolled in public and private
primary education institutions. The original variable does not account for the number
of students relative to total country population. In order to do so, I have generated a
new variable that is number of primary education pupils divided by total population.
In general, more developed societies have a higher educated population. Lipset (1959)
argued that higher levels of education would both increase the citizens’ desire and
capacity to claim democracy. Furthermore, higher educated citizens, was argued to
be more suited to participate in the democratic proses. Accordingly, Hegre, Knutsen
and Rød (2012, 19) find that education has a positive and robust effect on democrati-
zation. This is in accordance with Barro’s (1999, 158) finding that the propensity for
democracy raises with primary schooling.
5.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.1 summarizes descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis
for 1980-2007. The dependent variable, change in Polity2, has a mean of 0.167. This
implies that changes in Polity2 more often are towards democracy than autocracy. The
most negative change in Polity2 a country has experienced from one year to the next
is −15. This observation is Gambia 1994. The extreme negative democratization was
caused by a military coup lead by Yahya Jammeh in 1994 (French, 1994). The coup
overthrew the democratically elected president and banned political activity, taking




Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Polity2 1.455 7.274 -10 10 4129
Change in Polity2 0.167 1.722 -15 16 4097
Economic growth 1.698 7.411 -65.076 123.267 4326
Climatic disaster 0.002 0.014 0 0.322 4251
Global economic growth 1.681 1.616 -1.011 4.819 4406
Regime duration 23.042 29.172 0 198 4188
Corruption 3.092 1.399 0 6 3026
Oil rents of GDP 6.711 13.819 0 105.95 3316
Civil conflict onset 0.035 0.183 0 1 4403
Income inequality (log) 2.969 0.556 -0.368 4.418 4324
Primary education 0.118 0.047 0.023 0.29 3682
The most positive change in Polity2 a country has seen from one year to the next is
16. There are three country-year observations that take this value. First, Argentina’s
Polity2 score was increased from−8 in 1982, to 8 in 1983. Second, Uruguay went from a
Polity2 score of −7 in 1984 to 9 in 1985. Finally, Panama’s Polity2 score was increased
from −8 in 1988, to 8 in 1989. These countries have several commonalities. First of
all, they were all democratic countries in the 1960s. Then, military coups rendered the
countries autocratic in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Finally, the increase in Polity2
of 16 occurred when the countries returned to democracy during the third wave of
democratization (Remmer, 1992).16
The main explanatory variable, economic growth has a mean of 1.70. The standard
deviation is 7.41. The lowest value a country has obtained on the economic growth
variable is −65.08 percent points. This observation is Iraq 1991. The severely negative
growth was the result of economic mismanagement and wars (Alnasrawi, 1994, 151).
In particular, the negative growth occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf war (where
Iraq invaded Kuwait), after which the international community launched a series of
economic sanctions against the country. From Table 5.1 we see that the most posi-
tive economic growth a country has seen is 123.27. This country-year observation is
Equatorial Guinea in 1997. The massive growth was the result of discovery of large
oil reserves in 1996 (Blum, 2004).
16In Argentina and Uruguay the autocratic regimes were dissolved as a result of internal pressures.
In Panama however, the democratization followed an invasion by the United States in 1980 (Remmer,
1992).
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Notably, both the level of income and democracy display an upward sloping trend.
This is illustrated in Figure 1.1, but also in the descriptive statistics because average
changes in the variables are positive. That observation might signal non-stationarity in
the (level) variables, and can result in spurious estimates if not accounted for. This is
yet another motivation for first differencing income and democracy before estimation.
The first difference of a variable that moves around a linear time trend will render it
stationary, see (Wooldridge, 2009, 393) for details. Figure 5.3 plots economic growth
against change in Polity2.
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Clearly, the upward sloping trend in Figure 1.1 is now removed. Moreover, Figure 5.3
displays a slightly negative relationship between the two variables in first differences.
Yet, as nothing else is controlled for, the figure does not inform us about causal
relationships.
5.5 Missing data and measurement error
The dataset I have constructed is as mentioned initially in this chapter, unbalanced.
This implies that there are missing values for certain country-year observations. The
main reason for why the dataset is unbalanced is that data are taken from several
sources. Raw datasets have included different countries and have different time-series.
For instance, while the Polity IV dataset ranges from 1800 until 2011, the ICRG dataset
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goes from 1984 to 2012. The dataset is also unbalanced because countries have entered
the dataset at different times. For instance, several Eastern European countries for
natural reasons entered the datasets in the beginning of the 1990s. To limit the
challenge of an unbalanced dataset I have limited the time-series in the analysis to
range from 1980 to 2007. Limiting the time-series in this manner is also likely to
improve the data quality, as older data is likely to be less credible. It should be noted
however, that limiting the time-series in this manner favors short term effects over
long term effects. Even though missing values are never beneficial, it poses a limited
problem if the missing values are random. Then, as a consequence of reduced sample
size, the standard deviation increases which makes it harder to prove significant effects
(Wooldridge, 2009, 322). If on the other hand, there are systemic missing values, i.e.
the missing values are correlated with the dependent variable, the estimates can turn
out biased. If for instance governments in authoritarian states are worse at reporting
their economic data then more democratic states, then authoritarian states will be
underrepresented in the sample. If there at the same time is a negative effect of
economic growth on democratization, then the missing values are systemic, and the
regression results will be biased upwards (towards zero). The effect of economic growth
on democratization will in other words appear to be a weaker than what it actually is.
The use of lagged variables (both for explanatory variables and instruments) am-
plifies the number of missing values. The reason is that one loses the same number
of observations of the variable that the number of years it has been lagged by. For
instance, when economic growth is lagged by one year, the first economic growth ob-
servation in the time-series is dropped from the regression. If economic growth was
lagged by two years, the two first economic growth observations would be excluded
etc.17
Table B.1 in appendix B, provides an overview of percentage missing values for rel-
evant variables. It illustrates that the coverage on the main variables in the analysis,
economic growth and democratization is good. Out of 4406 country-year observa-
tions, Polity2 has 277 missing, which implies that 6.29 of the variable’s observations
are missing. The economic growth variable only has 2.59 percent missing observations.
From Table B.1 we see that three control variables have a relatively high number of
missing observations. First, the corruption variable has 31.32 percent missing obser-
vations. Second, oil rents of GDP, has 24.74 percent missing observations. Finally,
primary education has 16.43 percent missing.18 When control variables are included
17Furthermore, when using lagged values, countries that have holes in their time-series, will lose
both this observation and the number of observations that the variable has been lagged by.
18It is not surprising that the data coverage on ICRG and World Bank data are more limited than
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in the regressions, the number of observations included is reduced by almost one half.
This implies that the different variables have missing values on different country-year
observations. As a robustness test, I will exclude the control variables with the highest
amount of missing observations, to see whether it alters the results.
Imputation is one method to address missing data. It implies replacing missing
observations with probable values based on other available information (Honaker and
King, 2010, 561). However, imputation is not unproblematic. One is generating
observations where one in reality does not have data. Imputation is furthermore
not a good method for addressing missing observations in my dataset because the
missing data consists mainly of entire time series. For instance, it makes little sense
to imputate values on variables for Eastern European countries before they existed.
More generally, because the dataset consists of country-year observations, imputation
can be challenging as different factors are likely to be decisive for economic growth
in Norway and Zimbabwe. Thus, using identical variables to generate data on the
economic growth variable may not make a lot of sense.
Measurement error denotes the difference between the observed variable and the
variable that is included the regression equation (Wooldridge, 2009, 842). Measure-
ment error leads to biased regression estimates if the error is correlated with the
observed explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2009, 319). Underreporting of economic
growth is one possible source of measurement error. Foreign aid can for some (poor)
countries be an incentive to do so. If it is the case that poor countries have lower
levels of democracy, this implies that the measurement error is systemic. The reason
is that it will appear like poor countries have a lower growth than what they actually
have, at the same time as they have a lower probability of democratization. Then,
the estimated effect of economic growth on democratization is biased downwards, i.e.
it appears stronger (more negative) than the true value. Another possible source
of measurement error is preconceived perceptions about democracy levels in certain
countries. If for instance the Polity2 coders have a perception that African counties
are less democratic than other countries all else being equal, it would lead to systemic
measurement error, with downwards bias. Possible measurement errors and systemic
missing observations must be taken into consideration when conclusions are drawn
from the regression analysis.
Now that the theoretical framework, econometric methods and data has been pre-
sented, it is time to turn to the regression analysis. In chapter 6 I run an introductory
analysis by replicating the most common finding in the literature, namely a positive
for instance Polity and Penn world table.
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effect of income level on level of democracy. Then, I demonstrate that problems of
time-series persistence and simultaneity cannot be ruled out. These econometric con-
cerns are addressed in the main analysis in chapter 7. It is furthermore tested whether
the results from the benchmark regressions are robust. Finally, in chapter 8 I in-






In this chapter I do three things. First, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) methods
to replicate the most prominent finding in previous research, namely a positive effect
of income level on level of democracy. Second, I perform panel data tests for unit
roots in both of these variables. Third, I perform two different tests for simultaneity.
The central message in this chapter is that the data seems to contain both unit roots
and simultaneity between the key variables. Ignoring these issues is likely to result in
seriously biased estimates.
6.1 OLS estimation of level effects
Previous attempts to identify a causal effect of income on democracy might suffer
from problems with i) unit root in the series and ii) simultaneity between variables.
To demonstrate how these issues matter, I start the econometric part of the thesis by
ignoring both issues. That is, in this section I replicate the common finding in previous
research of a positive effect of income on democracy. This is achieved by using OLS
methods (which assume no simultaneity) to estimate the effect of the level of income
(GDP per capita) on the level of democracy (Polity2). In particular I parameterize
equations (4.4) and (4.6), extended with a battery of controls. Results are reported
in Table 6.1. Models 1 and 2 replicate standard pooled OLS regressions (equation
(4.4)). In model 3 time dummy variables are also included. Models 4 and 5 control for
country fixed effects (equation (4.6)). In model 6 both time and country fixed effects
are controlled for.
The results in models 1 through 5 reproduce the well-documented positive rela-
tionship between log income and democracy found in e.g. Barro (1999), Epstein et al.
(2006) and Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2011). A one percent increase in income
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level is predicted to go together with a substantial increase in democracy level, even
though the size of the income coefficient varies between the models.1
Table 6.1: OLS 1980-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Economic level (t-1) (log) 2.35*** 2.02*** 1.76*** 1.50* 6.66*** 0.78
(6.99) (3.02) (2.75) (1.68) (5.01) (0.64)
Regime duration (t-1) -0.012 -0.018 -0.19*** -0.19***
(-1.10) (-1.64) (-5.45) (-5.16)
Corruption (t-1) 0.83*** 1.43*** -0.049 0.31**
(2.71) (4.01) (-0.29) (2.13)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.027 -0.054**
(-5.47) (-5.97) (-1.08) (-2.04)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) 1.93 2.32** -0.36 -0.13
(1.55) (2.00) (-0.95) (-0.46)
Income inequality (t-1) 0.49 0.22 -1.00 -0.64
(0.38) (0.17) (-1.41) (-0.85)
Primary education (t-1) -1.03 7.70 -8.16 10.1
(-0.12) (0.96) (-0.67) (1.05)
R-squared 0.183 0.410 0.467 0.008 0.264 0.469
Observations 4019 2034 2034 4019 2034 2034
Number of countries 160 115 115 160 115 115
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses. Significance
levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
This finding is also in accordance with Figure 1.1 in the introduction chapter that
illustrates the positive correlation between income and democracy. While inclusion of
country fixed effects in model 5 increases the point estimate, the positive coefficient
disappears all together when controlling for time fixed effects in model 6. Notably,
Acemoglu et al. (2008) use time fixed effects throughout when they argue that the
income effect is non-existent. While these authors point to fixed country effects as
1As the purpose of this section is to replicate the common finding of a positive effect of income
on democracy, control variables and other features with the regressions will not be discussed.
56
crucial, the results presented here might indicate that fixed year effects are more
important. Note that the year dummies effectively control for the upward sloping
trend in Figure 1.1. Still, if income and democracy level contain unit roots and/or
there is simultaneity between the variables, all results in Table 6.1 will remain biased.
In the following sections I test for these econometric concerns.
6.2 Unit root tests
The concern for unit roots in income and democracy levels is raised by the observation
that both series seem to be highly persistent. The series furthermore seem to be
growing with time. Combined, these observations raise the question of whether the
series are non-stationary with upward trends. Figure 6.1 plots the World economic
income level (measured as the cross-sectional mean of observed log real GDP per
capita, along the left axis) and World democracy level (measured as the cross-sectional
mean of observed polity levels, along the right axis) over time.2
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From Figure 6.1 we clearly see that both series have upward trends. However, whether
the processes contain unit roots depends on whether they come back to the upward
2Since this figure just plots the unweighted average of cross-country observations, it severely
understates the importance of countries with large populations. For instance, a small (but rich and
democratic) country such as Norway is given the same weight as a large (but poor and less democratic)
country like Pakistan. Nevertheless, the figure is at least an attempt to illustrate some overall time
series properties of the two key variables. It should also be noted that controlling for country fixed
effects in the regressions should take (most of) this bias into account.
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linear trend following shocks in income and democracy levels. It is not clear from the
figure that they do. Thus, tests are carried out to determine whether it can be ruled
out that the variables’ time series contain unit roots. The upward trends in both series
are accounted for in the tests. In particular, it is tested for whether ρ = 1 in a version
of equation (4.7) in which a linear time trend is included:
xit = ρxit−1 + νt+ uxit
Here, t denotes the linear trend while ν is its growth rate. Note that this equation is
panel specific. Thus, the unit root test amounts to check whether ρ = 1 in each of the
panels, and then construct a summary statistic that combines the results from all the
panel specific tests. The null hypothesis is that ρ = 1 ∀ i.
Table 6.2: Unit root test for Polity2 and GDP/capita
Statistic P-value
Polity2
Inverse chi-squared (318) P 335.720 0.237
Inverse normal Z 0.174 0.569
Inverse logit t (599) L* -1.6982 0.045
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.703 0.241
Real GDP per capita (log)
Inverse chi-squared (332) P 390.053 0.015
Inverse normal Z 2.632 0.996
Inverse logit t (819) L* 2.370 0.991
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 2.253 0.012
Notes: This is a Fisher-type unit-root test for Polity2 and
logged Real GDP per capita respectively. It is based on aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller tests. H0 is that all panels contain unit
roots. Number of panels is 161 for Polity2 and 167 for logged
income level. AR parameters are panel-specific. Panel means
and time trends are included.
Table 6.2 provides the results from the unit root tests. Results from four different
estimators are reported.3 These differ in the way they construct the p-values, see Choi
3Some of this information is taken from the Stata user manual. I refer to the section explaining
the command xtunitroot for further details regarding panel unit root tests.
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(2001) for details. The P statistic can be used when the number of panels is finite.
The Pm statistic on the other hand is a modified version that is suitable when the
number of panels tend to infinity. The Z statistic and the L* statistic can be used
in either cases. The most interesting numbers are in the last column, as these are
the p-values. A p-value lower than 0.05 implies rejection of the null hypothesis at
a 5 percentage level. Evidently, three out of four unit root tests do not reject the
hypothesis that there are unit roots in all panels for Polity2. For logged real GDP per
capita, two tests reject H0. Note that H0 is a very strong claim, as it states that there
is a unit root in all panels. It is enough that some panels contain unit roots to make
regression estimates biased. Thus, it cannot be reject that neither Polity2 nor logged
real GDP per capita are random walk processes. Furthermore, Choi (2001) finds that
the Z statistic offers the best combination of size and power in a simulation exercise.4
To make myself perfectly clear, I am not claiming that Polity2 and logged real
GDP per capita necessarily contain unit roots. I am however, emphasizing that the
possibility of unit roots cannot be ruled out. Thus, in order to avoid unreliable re-
gression estimates, the possible presence of unit roots is controlled for. Fortunately,
taking the first difference of the variables, fixes the problem of persistent time-series
(Wooldridge, 2009, 393). The reason is that after first differencing a variable that
contain unit root, all that is left is the white noise component of the variable. This
component is per definition independent of xit−1. Accordingly, the variable is now
stationary rather than persistent.
In sum, possible presence of a unit root implies that both democracy and income
level need to be first differenced in the econometric model. Thus, I will study the effect
of economic growth on changes in democracy. However, as long as the econometric
model is correctly specified and the unit root results are valid, the empirical estimates
should reflect the level effects in the theory model. To see why, consider once again
the linear equation yit = βxit−1. Under the assumption that this equation is true in
all periods, including t− 1, then also yit−1 = βxit−2 must hold. Subtracting one from
the other yields the difference equation ∆yit = β∆xit−1, where β is exactly the same
coefficient as before. Thus, if the level equation is true, one can always estimate the
difference equation and interpret the result in level terms.
4An alternative to the Dickey-Fuller specification in the Fischer unit root tests is the Phillips-
Perron option. Using that specification does not alter the results (not shown).
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6.3 Two tests of simultaneity
Granger causality and Hausman specification tests are carried out to get an indication
of whether there is simultaneity between economic growth and change in democracy.
Granger causality is a statistical concept of causality based on prediction. In particu-
lar, tests are carried out to determine whether one time series is useful for forecasting
another. A time series x is said to Granger cause y if it can be shown through a series
of t-tests and F-tests on lagged values of x, that those values provide statistically sig-
nificant information about future values of y. Granger (1969) argues that simultaneity
between two variables can be determined by testing for such predictability in both
directions.5 However, one should note that Granger causality does not imply causality
in the standard sense. Thus, it is an indication, not a proof, of true causality.6
For my case the Granger causality test amounts to i) testing whether economic
growth Granger causes changes in democracy, and ii) testing whether changes in
democracy Granger causes economic growth. Granger causality in both directions
is consistent with a true causal simultaneity (although not a necessary condition).
Concretely, in the first part of the test I estimate the following regression, where yit
and xit now stand for democratization and economic growth, respectively:
7
yit = β1yit−1 + . . .+ βpyit−p + γ1xit−1 + . . .+ γqxit−q + uit
Then, a F-test is carried out to determine whether economic growth provides significant
information about democracy. Here, H0 of no Granger causality implies γ1 = . . . =
γq = 0. H1 on the other hand, is that x Granger causes y.
Second, it is tested whether y Granger causes x. Now the following regression is
estimated:
xit = α1xit−1 + . . .+ αpxit−p + σ1yit−1 + . . .+ σqyit−q + uit
Now, H0 of no Granger causality amounts to σ1 = . . . = σq = 0. H1 is that y Granger
causes x. I set the number of lags (q) to 3 in both regressions.
A Hausman specification test can also give an indication of whether there is simul-
5Granger also shows that the simultaneity mechanism can be considered the sum of the two causal
mechanisms (Granger, 1969, 438).
6After all, Granger causality is only a statistical statement about correlations across time. One
can think of other variables that cause variation in both x and y, i.e. the classical concern of omitted
variables. See Wooldridge (2009, 650) for a critical discussion of the concept Granger causality.
7Note the slight abuse of notation compared to earlier expressions, where yit and xit denoted
variables in levels.
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taneity in the data. It tests’ whether estimates from one estimator are significantly
different from another (Hausman, 1978). H0 is that estimates do not differ systemat-
ically from each other. I compare the estimates from an OLS fixed effects estimator
with the estimates from an Arellano Bond GMM estimator. As the latter addresses
simultaneity problems in the data while the former does not, differences in estimates
indicates that there might be simultaneity in the data. Table 6.3 reports the results
from the Granger causality and the Hausman specification tests.
Table 6.3: Statistical tests of simultaneity
Null hypothesis F-stat P-value Observations
X does not Granger cause Y 6.34 0.096 3937
Y does not Granger cause X 6.48 0.091 3936
Hausman, Difference not systemic 13.55 0.059 2033/1805
Notes: Granger causality tests based on an Arellano-Bond GMM estimator with 3
lags. X denotes economic growth, Y denotes changes in democracy. The reported
F-stat is a Wald-type test of the joint significance of all estimated coefficients on the
lags. Hausman specification test compares estimates from an OLS estimator with
an Arellano Bond GMM estimator. Both estimators includes control variables and
control for country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered on countries.
The results from the Granger Causality tests reject H0 at the ten percentage level in
both cases. Thus, the data are weakly supportive of Granger causality in both direc-
tions, and thereby provide some indication of simultaneity between economic growth
and democratization. I also carried out the Granger causality test based on an OLS
estimator without robust standard errors. Then, H0 of no Granger causality is re-
jected even at a one percentage level (result not shown). Accordingly, Fayad et al.
(2012) find that H0 of no Granger causality is rejected at a one percent level when
they test for simultaneity between income and democracy levels. The results from the
Hausman specification test in Table 6.3 furthermore shows that it is rejected at a six
percent level that the estimates from the OLS estimator and the Arellano-Bond GMM
estimator does not differ systematically from each other. This is a further indication
that there might be simultaneity in the data. Overall, the statistical tests seem sup-
portive of simultaneity between economic growth and democratic development. Thus,
instrumental variables methods are applied throughout the main analysis to avoid
simultaneity bias in the estimates.
The central message from this chapter is that the data seems to contain both unit
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roots and simultaneity between key variables. Thus, in order to avoid unreliable esti-
mates in the main analysis, these issues must be addressed. Unit roots are controlled
for by first differencing income and democracy. Simultaneity is addressed by using




This chapter reports the results from the main econometric analysis. It consists of
three parts. First I present the benchmark estimation results when using the following
estimators: i) pooled and fixed effects ordinary least squares (OLS and OLS FE), ii)
two stage least squares (2SLS), and iii) Arellano-Bond GMM (AB-GMM). The choice
of these estimators is motivated in the methodology chapter. Second I offer a broader
discussion of main findings. Third, I present a comprehensive battery of robustness
tests. The key message in this chapter is that once unit roots and simultaneity issues
are accounted for, income seems to have a negative causal effect on democracy. This
finding dramatically contrasts the conventional wisdom in previous literature and in
policy debates.
7.1 Benchmark results
7.1.1 Ordinary least squares
Table 7.1 summarizes the results from pooled OLS and OLS FE regressions. The
econometric specification is similar to the models estimated in Table 6.1. That is, I
reestimate the equations (4.4) (pooled OLS) and (4.6) (OLS FE) (supplemented with
control variables), except that income and democracy are now used in first differences.1
Thus, the objective of Table 7.1 is to demonstrate how results change when the presence
of unit root is taken into account.2
1A comment is in place: time dummies are not included in neither of the regression models in
Table 7.1. This renders the results comparable with the 2SLS estimates in Table 7.2. Time dummies
cannot be included in the 2SLS estimation because global economic growth is used as an instrument.
2Importantly, simultaneity between economic growth and democratization remains uncontrolled
for.
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Table 7.1: OLS 1980-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS FE OLS FE
Economic growth (t-1) -0.0032 -0.020*** -0.0013 -0.017**
(-0.84) (-3.02) (-0.32) (-2.16)
Regime duration (t-1) -0.0012* 0.018***
(-1.73) (3.16)
Corruption (t-1) -0.079*** -0.075
(-2.86) (-1.34)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.0084*** -0.0097**
(-4.40) (-2.24)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) -0.048 0.014
(-0.26) (0.065)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) -0.11 -0.42**
(-1.01) (-2.08)
Primary education (t-1) -0.84 2.65
(-1.15) (1.00)
R-squared 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.018
Observations 4031 2033 4031 2033
Number of countries 159 115 159 115
Country FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No
Notes: Dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on
countries in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Consider first the results in models 1 and 2. The parameter of interest is negative,
but far from significant in model 1. In model 2 however, the negative coefficient is
significant even at a one percentage level. These results stand in sharp contrast to their
counterparts when using variables in levels, i.e. models 1 and 2 in Table 6.1. However,
the controls comes with a significant reduction in the number of observations. I do
not know whether the significant coefficient in model 2 is due to variation captured by
the controls, or to the exclusion of observations. Just as in Table 6.1, failing to control
for fixed effects might lead to biased estimates. Models 3 and 4 address this concern.
Again, the point estimates turn negative once unit roots are controlled for by means of
first differencing. In particular they challenge the results reported in models 4 and 5
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in Table 6.1. Also, inclusion of the standard set of controls (model (4)) leads to highly
significant estimates. Overall, these results represent a first step towards the central
message in this thesis, namely that the link between income and democracy might be
more involved than commonly held views suggest.
How can one interpret the coefficients reported here? Take the point estimate in
model 4, which arguably is the most reliable (due to control for both time varying
regressors and fixed effects). It can be interpreted as follows: when a country’s eco-
nomic growth rate increases by one percentage point (say, from 1 to 2 percent), then
that country is predicted to experience a decline in democratic development equal to
0.017.
Arguably, the results presented here differ quite dramatically from the level equa-
tion counterparts in Table 6.1. While the economic level coefficient had a positive sign
in all models in Table 6.1, the economic growth coefficient has a negative sign in all
the models in Table 7.1, even though it is only significant when control variables are
included. Moreover, the results in Table 6.1 and Table 7.1 combined suggest that first
differencing the key variables is far more important for the results than controlling for
fixed effects.3,4 However, at this stage an important remark is in place: even though
the estimate of income growth on democratic development is statistically significant
in Table 7.1, it is of modest importance quantitatively. For example, an increase in
the per capita growth rate equal to one standard deviation (in other words a “typical”
increase in economic growth), is predicted to reduce democratic development the next
year by 0.017× 7.4 = 0.126. This effect is arguably not very large economically.
For the sake of completeness, I next comment on the estimates of significant control
variables. In model 2 regime duration is predicted to create a drop in democracy, but
the coefficient is only significant at a ten percentage level. That result is overturned in
model 4, where the coefficient is positive even at a one percentage level: when a regime
type has aged by one year, the country is predicted to see a positive change in polity of
0.018. Intuitively, this is consistent with the observation that countries have become
more democratic over time. The negative point estimate in model 2 might be due to
unobserved country specific factors, which bias the coefficient downwards when they
are not accounted for. In Table 6.1 the estimated effect of corruption on democracy
3The absolute size of the coefficients however, are similar in the growth and level models. This is
because the coefficients in Table 6.1 must be divided by 100 to be comparable with those in Table 7.1
(the growth coefficient has been multiplied by 100 to interpret estimates directly in percentage points).
For instance, after dividing the estimate in model 2 in Table 6.1 by 100, we get 0.0202. The comparable
estimate in model 2 in Table 7.1 is -0.020.
4The results reported here are also robust to controlling for random effects. The random effects
version of model 4 gives a point estimate equal to −0.020 with t-value equal to −3.02 (results not
shown).
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was positive and highly significant in most models, a rather counterintuitive result.
Here instead, corruption is negatively correlated with democratic development, even
though the link is insignificant when controlling for fixed effects. Thus, while Hegre and
Fjelde (2011) find that corruption strengthen the durability of autocratic- and semi-
autocratic regimes, it here seems that corruption, if anything, pushes countries further
towards autocracy. Both models 2 and 4 suggest that oil dependent countries (in terms
of oil income as percentage of GDP) have less positive democratic development. This
is in accordance with previous research (see e.g. Ross (2001)). One explanation might
be that income generated from natural resources such as oil, make the government less
indebted to the population than income generated from human and physical capital.
Income inequality has a negative sign in both models, but is only significant when
country specific factors are controlled for. A negative effect of income inequality is in
accordance with Boix’s (2003) argument that less inequality increases the probability
of democracy.
The results reported in this section demonstrate that popular claims about a pos-
itive effect of income on democracy might be premature. Indeed, once the variables
are first differenced to control for unit roots, the estimates turn negative. However,
these results come with at least two restrictions. First, the negative coefficients in
Table 7.1 seem rather small in absolute value from an economic point of view. That
is, the policy implications of those coefficients might be limited. Second, and most
importantly, the analysis so far has abstracted from any simultaneity problem. This
observation renders the current estimates prone to biases caused by reversed causality,
especially in light of the introductory simultaneity tests in chapter 6. Thus, we should
move on to more advanced econometric techniques that take simultaneity problems
into account. This is exactly what I do in the next two sections.
7.1.2 Two stage least squares
Motivated by the methodological discussion in section 4.4.1, I next report the estimates
when equation (4.6) (extended with control variables) is parameterized by means of
2SLS. Once again, Polity2 in first differences is the dependent variable. Country fixed
effects are controlled for in all models. I do not control for time fixed effects because
global economic growth is used as an instrument. Table 7.2 report the main results. As
an introductory exercise, I first estimate the effect of economic growth on democratic
development without the control variables in models 1 and 2. Model 1 represents the
first stage, i.e. effects of the instruments on economic growth. All the test statistics
strongly suggest that climatic disasters and global income growth provide relevant
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information about the movements in the economic growth rate.
Table 7.2: 2SLS 1980-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 2SLS(1st) 2SLS(2nd) 2SLS(1st) 2SLS(2nd)
Economic growth (t-1) – -0.029* – -0.198***
(-1.74) (-3.88)
Climatic disaster (t-1) -18.643*** – -15.193 –
(-3.76) (-1.52)
Global economic growth (t-1) 0.968*** – 0.623*** –
(8.57) (5.58)
Regime duration (t-1) -0.003 0.021***
(-0.19) (3.04)
Corruption (t-1 ) -0.209 -0.180**
(-1.24) (-2.52)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) 0.003 -0.007
(0.06) (-0.73)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) 0.114 0.005
(0.14) (0.02)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) 2.405*** 0.087
(3.01) (0.27)
Primary education (t-1) 10.765 2.850
(1.17) (0.98)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 41.552*** 41.552*** 16.505*** 16.505***
Hansen test (J-statistic) 0.168 0.168 0.289 0.289
Observations 3,930 3,930 2,019 2,019
Number of countries 155 155 113 113
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No
Notes: Dependent variable in the first stage regressions is economic growth. Dependent variable in
the second stage regressions is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on countries in
parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Kleibergen-Paap
Waald F-statistic test for weak identification. H0: Equation is weakly identified. Hansen test for
overidentification. H0: Too many instruments are not included.
For starters, both instruments have highly significant point estimates with t-values
equal to −3.76 and 8.57, respectively. The rule of thumb here is that the t-value
should 3 or higher in absolute value. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic demonstrates
that the instruments are jointly significant at virtually any significance level. Here, the
rule is that the F-value should be 10 or higher (Staiger and Stock, 1997). Furthermore,
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the Hansen test of the overidentification restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis
that both instruments are valid.
Turning to the estimated coefficients in the first stage, the coefficient of −18.643
is comparable with the estimated effect of climatic disasters on economic growth in
Bergholt and Lujala (2012). Intuitively, climatic disasters are destructive for hu-
man life and capital, and therefore hamper the potential of economic growth in most
economies. Global income growth on the other hand is predicted to induce economic
growth within countries: an increase in global income growth by one percentage point
stimulates country-level economic growth rate by 0.968 percentage points. This is
in line with the vast business cycles literature which documents that global business
cycles are important drivers of macroeconomic conditions in most economies.
Given the relevance of the instruments, model 2 represents the second stage when
controls are not included. The estimated causal effect of economic growth on demo-
cratic development is −0.029, although this result is only significant at a ten percent-
age level. The point estimate is still far more negative (and more significant) than its
counterparts in Table 7.1. The models without controls in that table, models 1 and 3,
produced point estimates very close to zero (−0.0032 and −0.0013 respectively). How-
ever, compared to models 2 and 4 in Table 7.1, the 2SLS estimates without control
variables are only about 50-70 percent more negative.
How do the results change when additional regressors are included? Models 3 and
4 in Table 7.2 present more robust results as these include controls for corruption, oil
dependency, civil conflict onset, income inequality, and education levels. Interestingly,
the first stage results reported in model 3 reveal that climatic disasters provide much
less information now than without controls. Indeed, the t-statistic has declined in
absolute value to 1.52, way below the rule of thumb that it should be 3 or higher.
This could imply that climatic disasters should be dropped as instrument when con-
trol variables are included in the regression. However, the Hansen (J statistic) test
does not indicate that neither of the instruments should be left out. Furthermore,
the Kleibergen-Paap statistic indicates that the instruments jointly remain strong de-
terminants for economic growth (this latter result is probably driven by the global
economic growth instrument). Consequently, both instruments are used.5
Turning to the second stage, model 4 points to a negative and highly significant
causal effect of economic growth on democratic development. The point estimate is
large in absolute value, suggesting that an increase in the income growth rate by one
percentage point reduces democratic development by 0.198. The policy relevance of
5I also estimated model 4 with only global income growth as instrument, but the coefficients were
similar (results not shown).
68
this estimate is better understood if we calculate the effect of a one standard deviation
increase in the explanatory variable (i.e. a “typical” increase given the volatility in
economic growth). Model 4 implies that such an increase will create a drop in Polity2
equal to −0.198×7.4 = −1.46. This effect is undoubtedly substantial, and it is further-
more statistically significant at a one percent level.6 Regarding the control variables,
only two remain significant. Regime duration still seems to stimulate democratization
while the opposite is true for corruption.7 Overall, these results demonstrate the rele-
vance of controlling for reversed causality, and provide significant support to the idea
that income might affect democracy negatively.
An important question that arises from the analysis so far, is why the 2SLS esti-
mates are so negative compared to the estimates using OLS and OLS FE. A first step
towards answering this question might come about from reviewing the theory behind
the OLS estimator. Consider once again the simple regression equation (4.1), which
is restated below for convenience (control variables are abstracted from):
yit = β0 + β1xit−1 + uit
Remember the definitions of β1, the population parameter of interest, and the OLS




, βˆ1 = β1 +
Cov(xit−1, uit)
V ar(xit−1)
If Cov(xit−1, uit) = 0, then the OLS estimator βˆ1 represents an accurate approximation
to the true population parameter β1. The interesting question however is what happens
to the OLS estimate when Cov(xit−1, uit) 6= 0.8 Note that any variable not included
in (4.1), which affects yit, must be part of the residual uit. Acemoglu et al. (2008)
provide valuable insight using this observation. In particular they point out that
almost all theories in political science, sociology and economics suggest that we have
Cov(xit−1, uit) ≥ 0. In other words, it is hard to think of any factors that are left out
of (4.1) (or more importantly its counterpart with controls), that will affect income
growth in one direction and democratization in the other. Take for instance the rule of
law. It seems likely that more rule of law will have a positive effect on both economic
6The results are similar when country fixed effects are not controlled for. When control variables
are not included the growth estimate is −0.032 and t-value is −1.98. When control variables are
included the growth coefficient is −0.149 and the t-value is −4.07 (results not shown).
72SLS estimation typically comes at the cost of larger standard deviations compared to OLS, see
Wooldridge (2009) for details.
8We learned in chapter 4 that this is a violation of (A.4), one of the assumptions needed for
consistent estimation of β1.
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growth and democratization. It is hard to see however, how rule of law can have
opposite effects on these variables. Thus, if rule of law leads to omitted variable bias
when left out of (4.1), then it should lead to Cov(xit−1, uit) ≥ 0. A similar argument
should hold for other omitted variables. Comparing the expressions for β1 and βˆ1, we
see that this implies




i.e. that the OLS estimate is biased upwards. Therefore, estimates from the OLS
regressions (including those who control for fixed effects) can be viewed as representing
upper bounds of the true causal effect of economic growth on democratization. This
seems to be a reasonable explanation for why the 2SLS estimates, which arguably
can control for most of the bias, are more negative than the pooled OLS estimates.
Notably, also Acemoglu et al. (2008, 817) report considerably more negative estimates
when they instrument the economic level (compared to the standard OLS results).
7.1.3 Arellano-Bond GMM
A limitation of the 2SLS estimator is that it requires at least one external instrument
per endogenous explanatory variable. If one suspects that several explanatory vari-
ables suffer from simultaneity problems or other sources of bias, establishing enough
external instruments quickly becomes a daunting task. Furthermore, one can never
fully rule out that at least one of the external instruments I have used are endogenous
to democratization. These observations motivate the use of an alternative estimator
to 2SLS, namely the one proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). A more detailed
discussion of this estimator is offered in the methodology chapter.
Table 7.3 provides the results from Arellano-Bond GMM estimations. Now, all
control variables are instrumented by their own lags. Thus, given that the specification
is appropriate I control for simultaneity in the entire set of explanatory variables.
Change in Polity2 is still the dependent variable. Country fixed effects are removed
in the first step of the estimation procedure through first differentiating. Due to the
large number of instruments involved in Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, I set up and
report a battery of misspecification tests for each model. The Sargan and Hansen
tests share as null hypothesis that the overidentification restrictions are valid (i.e.
that the instruments are not correlated with the residual term). The Sargan test can
handle an arbitrary high number of instruments, but is not robust to heteroskedasticity.
The Hansen test on the other hand is robust, but can be weakened by too many
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instruments. Thus, I report both. Regarding persistence in the residuals, I test for first
and second order autocorrelation. Arellano-Bond estimation of a correctly specified
model should, result in first order autocorrelation (in the residuals), but not in second
order autocorrelation.
Table 7.3: AB-GMM 1980-2007
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
AB AB AB AB
Economic growth (t-1) -0.026* -0.055** -0.044 -0.055**
(-1.76) (-2.25) (-1.30) (-2.08)
Regime duration (t-1) 0.018 0.073*
(0.58) (1.84)
Corruption (t-1) -0.16 -0.27
(-1.11) (-0.83)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.015 0.0076
(-0.59) (0.24)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) -0.64 -0.40
(-0.93) (-0.61)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) -0.79 -0.49
(-0.93) (-0.56)
Primary eduction (t-1) 26.7* 8.51
(1.67) (0.52)
Sargan test 0.749 0.248 0.943 0.346
Hansen test 0.420 0.649 0.778 0.513
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.780 0.830 0.048 0.507
Observations 4,000 1,805 4,000 1,805
Number of countries 159 113 159 113
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered
on countries in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sargan and Hansen test for overidentification. H0: Too many
instruments are not included. AR(1) tests for first order serial correlation. AR(2)
tests for second order serial correlation. H0 in both AR tests is that there is not
serial correlation.
Model 1 is a preliminary version without any control variables or control for fixed year
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effects (international trends). Model 2 adds the standard set of controls to model 1.
Model 3 instead extends model 1 with time controls. The full specification is given in
model 4, where both the set of standard controls and the time dummies are included.
Models 1 and 3 utilize the entire time series of lagged observations as instruments, as
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Models 2 and 4 on the other hand limit the
number of instruments per variable to 15. This is because the degrees of freedom fall
when more instrumented control variables are included. 16 instruments or more break
down the inference results, as indicated by the Sargan and Hansen tests (results not
reported). Models 2 and 4 can therefore be viewed as hybrid specifications of those
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991) respectively.9
Starting with the results in model 1, we see that the estimated causal effect of
economic growth on democratic development is negative and significant at the ten
percentage level. The point estimate is −0.026, remarkably similar to the correspond-
ing 2SLS estimate (model 3 in Table 7.2), and considerably more negative than the
OLS estimates in Table 7.1. Neither the Sargan test nor the Hansen test can reject
the null hypothesis that the overidentification restrictions are valid (p-values of 0.749
and 0.420 respectively). Further confidence is gained from the autoregressive tests.
The null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation is rejected at the one percentage
level (p-value equal to 0.000), while no indication of second order autocorrelation is
found (p-value equal to 0.78). All these specification tests strengthen the estimation
result.10
Model 2 provides a more negative point estimate of −0.055, significant at the
five percentage level. However, in contrast to its counterpart in Table 7.2 (model 4
in that table), none of the control variables are significant. Models 3 reveals that
controlling only for time fixed effects in this GMM setting makes the parameter of
interest insignificant at the ten percentage level. Still, the point estimate remains
relatively stable compared to model 2. Model 4 repeats the story in model 2. That
is, the estimated effect of economic growth on democratic development is −0.055 and
significant at the five percentage level. The overall impression of the specification tests
is that neither the use of instruments nor the dynamic specification seem invalid. The
only exception is the AR(2) test in model 3, which suggests that the inference suffer
from some higher order autocorrelation.
For sake of completeness I briefly explain the control variables once more. Regime
duration still has a positive sign, but is only significant when time fixed effects are
9See the methodology chapter for details.
10Although I do not comment much on the specification tests from now on, one should note that
they are relatively stable across estimations.
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controlled for, and only at a ten percentage level. Primary education is significant for
the first time at the ten percentage level in model 2. The positive sign is in accordance
with Lipset’s (1959) modernization hypothesis. However, the result can hardly be said
to be robust in my regressions.
The main conclusion from the Arellano-Bond estimations is that economic growth
seems to have a negative causal effect on democratization, although the models without
control variables seem to struggle somewhat in reproducing this finding. This latter
finding is fairly common across estimation techniques. The growth coefficients that are
statistically significant however, are still important quantitatively. Take the coefficient
in model 4 for instance, which arguably is the most reliable point estimate in Table 7.3.
It implies that an increase in the growth rate by one standard deviation leads to 0.055×
7.4 = 0.407 less democratization as measured by the Polity scale. For comparison, the
difference in Polity2 score between India and the UK in 2011 was 1.
Interestingly, the estimate in model 4 lies somewhere in between those found using
pooled OLS and OLS FE on the one hand, and the prediction generated by 2SLS on
the other. The first observation is consistent with the argument made earlier that OLS
estimates are biased upwards. The second can be due to a number of things. However,
there are important reasons why one should not disregard the Arellano-Bond GMM
estimates (compared with 2SLS results). First of all, while any simultaneity between
the control variables and democratization is assumed away during 2SLS estimations,
these assumptions are relaxed here. Second, the battery of specification tests from
Arellano-Bond is largely supportive of both the number of instruments and dynamics.
Third, the Arellano-Bond results are robust to the flexible specification of international
time trends that is provided by time dummies. Fourth, while the 2SLS estimates vary
from −0.03 to −0.20, the Arellano-Bond estimates remain much more stable across
specifications. Overall, it might seem reasonable that the true population parameter
lies somewhere in between 2SLS results and Arellano-Bond results. Note however, that
to the extent that some of the positive covariance between income and democracy
(Cov(xit−1, uit)) remains, both 2SLS and Arellano-Bond still yields upward biased
estimates.
7.2 Some thoughts on the main results
Let us take a step back and review what the empirical exercises have produced so
far. Most importantly, the results illustrate the importance of taking unit roots and
simultaneity between income and democracy into account. Controlling for unit roots
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in an OLS setting is sufficient to alter the widely believed positive effect of income on
democracy to a negative effect. That in itself is of great importance, as it indicates that
economic stimulus to create democracy might fail. At least the negative coefficient
warns us against naively running level regressions without considering unit root issues.
However, even though the negative coefficient is statistically significant, it is arguably
of less economic significance due to upward bias caused by the OLS estimator. Once
simultaneity and omitted variable problems are taken seriously, the estimated effect
of income on democracy increases substantially in terms of quantitative significance.
Yet, even instrumental variables estimators deliver relative diverse point estimates. It
is possible that the 2SLS and the Arellano-Bond results represents upper and lower
bounds for the true population parameter. In any case, the negative effect of income on
democracy suggests that one should think carefully about how income is transferred
to poor countries. In particular, one should design wealth transfers in such a way
that they do minimal harm to democratic development. At least the benefits of these
transfers should be traded of against the costs in terms of higher risks of diverting
resources, corruption, etc.
In discussing the benchmark results further, it is instructive to compare model pre-
dictions with some real life observations. As the regression estimates represent average
effects across the sample, they are not well suited for predicting specific country cases.
Thus, I find it more constructive to review some cases that illustrate the predicted
effect in a broader sense. Keeping in mind that average economic growth from 1980 to
2007 was 1.69, Venezuela and Russia have that in common that they have had years of
high economic growth followed by democratic recession. Regardless of whether it was
purely the result of large oil reserves, the Venezuelan economy eventually grew rapidly
under the former President Hugo Chavez. From the economic recession in 2003 to
2007, the economy grew by 76 percent (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2007, 4). At the same
time Chavez expanded his own powers. Consequently, in 2006 Venezuela’s Polity2
score was reduced from 6 to 5. This trend furthermore continued. While the economic
growth advanced, Venezuela’s Polity2 level was reduced to −3 by 2009. For the Rus-
sian economy, 1998 marked the lowest point of the post-communist downturn. Due to
a debt default, the government was forced to devalue the Rouble. However, after this
crisis the Russian economy has grown rapidly. Between 1998 and 2007 the average
annual growth rate was 7 percent due to raising output and oil prices (Hanson, 2008,
2). At the same time the Kremlin has tightened political constrains. Consequently,
Russia saw a decline in its Polity2 level from 6 in 2006, to 4 in 2007.
Since I estimate linear models, the results from the benchmark regressions also
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imply that negative economic growth will have a positive effect on democratization.
This is consistent with what the economic crises literature claim to be the case for
authoritarian regimes (see e.g. Gasiorowski (1995) and Geddes (1999)). In particular,
Haggard and Kaufman (1995, 32-33) find that twenty-one out of twenty-seven demo-
cratic transitions between 1970 and 1990, occurred in regimes that had experienced
declining economic growth.11 A specific country case where democratic transition
occurred in times of economic difficulties is the Philippines. For several years the au-
tocratic President Marcos, received the necessary support from the private-sector elite
in the country. This support however, diminished from the beginning of the 1980s due
to the pressure from the global economic recession (Teorell, 2010, 74). Triggered by
the assassination of Marcos’ main political rival Aquino in 1983, public mobilization
against the regime developed. As the economic crisis aggravated (negative growth rates
of −6.97 in 1984, and −9.99 in 1985), Marcos’ legitimacy was further decreased. In an
attempt to calm down the masses, Marcos called for snap Presidential elections12 in
1986. Independent watchdog organizations concluded that an opponent won the elec-
tion. Yet, the state controlled electoral commission declared Marcos as winner, and
thereby helped intensify the protests against the regime. Within days these protests
forced Marcos from office, and the opposition candidate came to power (Haggard and
Kaufman, 1995, 65). This took the Philippines from a Polity2 score of −6 in 1985, to
1 in 1986. Furthermore, in 1987 the Philippines obtained a new constitution which
reinforced constrains on the power of the executive. Consequently, the Polity2 level
was increased to a democratic score of 8 in 1987. Even though it is clear that several
aspects contributed to the democratization of the Philippines, the economic crisis is
widely accepted as an important explanatory factor.
It is now time to see how robust the main results are. Thus, the rest of this chapter
is devoted to a number of robustness tests.
7.3 Robustness tests
The results from the benchmark regressions are supportive of the working hypothesis.
Economic growth does seem to have a negative effect on democratization. However,
to increase confidence in the picture drawn in the main analysis it must be vindicated
that it is not driven by a particular model specification or features of the data. Thus, in
this section I carry out a series of robustness tests. First, I look at other measurements
11Here, democratic transition is defined as the first year of a competitively elected government
(Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, 32).
12Snap election is an election called earlier than expected.
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of democracy. Second, I use growth in rainfall as an alternative 2SLS instrument on a
sub-Saharan sub-sample. Third, I test whether influential observations are driving the
results. Forth, I account for censoring in the data by estimating a Tobit model. Fifth,
I exclude the control variables with the highest percentage missing values. Finally, the
time-series is prolonged to range from 1950 to 2011. All in all, the results from the
main analysis hold up well.
Table B.2 in appendix B summarizes descriptive statistics for new variables added
in the robustness models. In this section I only interpret the economic growth coef-
ficient. Furthermore, misspecification tests are included in the tables but not com-
mented upon unless they deviate from expected values.
7.3.1 Alternative democratization measurements
In this section I test the robustness of the benchmark results against different mea-
surements of democracy. Two alternative measures are used in Table 7.4 as dependent
variables: i) the first differenced Scalar Index of Policies (from now on SIP2), and ii)
the first differenced civil liberties and political rights index (from now on FHI).
SIP2 ranges from 0, denoting least democratic, to 1, denoting most democratic.13
The index is derived from codings along the same dimensions as Polity2. Those are the
nature of the recruitment of executives, the extent to which the executive is constrained
by other institutions, and popular participation (Gates, Hegre, Jones and Strand,
2006, 897-898). Data on the two first dimensions are taken from the Polity IV dataset.
Data on the third dimension, political participation, are taken from Vanhanen’s (2000)
polyarchy index. It has been argued that codings on participation in the Polity IV
dataset are too subjective.14 Vanhanen’s participation measure is the percentage of
population that voted in the latest election (Gates et al., 2006, 897).15
A weakness with both Polity2 and SIP2 is that neither of them take civil liberties
and political rights directly into account. In section 1.3, I defined these factors as
decisive for democracy. In contrast, the measurement from Freedom House includes
codings on these factors. I have combined the civil liberties and political rights indexes
(labeled FHI).16 Civil liberties are defined as the liberties that allow for freedoms of
13I take the variable from Strand, Hegre, Gates and Dahl (2012).
14For further details see Gates et al. (2006, 897).
15To make the measure account for whether the election is decisive for selection of the execu-
tive, competition must also be taken into account. This is done by multiplying participation with
competition
30% if the election winner obtained more that 70 percent of the election votes. Competition
is here the percentage of the valid vote won by all parties except the plurality winner or winning
coalition. For more information see Gates et al. (2006)
16The variables are taken from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg
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expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
interference from the state (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg and Rothstein, 2011a, 42-43).
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including
the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for
public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who
have decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate (Teorell
et al., 2011a, 43). FHI is the unweighed average of the civil liberties and political
rights indicators. The original index ranges from 1 to 7, where 7 denotes the least
free society. However, I have inverted the index to render it comparable with Polity2
and SIP2. That is, here 1 denotes the least free society while 7 denotes the most free
society.17
I repeat the benchmark findings in Table 7.4 for convenience. Results from three
different regressions are reported for each of the dependent variables. The first set
of estimates (models 1, 4 and 7) are from the second stage of a 2SLS regression that
includes control variables and control for country fixed effects. The second set of
estimates (models 2, 5 and 8) are the results from the corresponding Arellano-Bond
GMM estimator. The third estimate set (models 3, 6 and 9) add controls for time
fixed effects to the Arellano-Bond regressions.
The economic growth coefficient is negative in all models in Table 7.4. However, it is
only statistically significant in some models where alternative dependent variables have
been applied. Consider first the models where change in SIP2 is the dependent variable
(models 4-6). Here, the negative growth coefficient is only statistically significant in
model 4, the 2SLS regression. The size of this coefficient however, is similar in size to
the corresponding coefficient in the benchmark model, when measured in terms of a
standard deviation change.18
and Rothstein, 2011b).
17As the time-series in my analysis is 1980-2007 and FHI captures all three criteria I defined as
decisive for democracy, one might ask why I do not use FHI as my main measure of democracy.
There are three reasons for this. First, FHI includes codings on indicators which I have not defined
as decisive for democracy e.g. property rights and academic freedoms. This can weaken the validity
of the estimates. Second, scores on FHI indicators are largely based on the subjective opinions of the
coder. The subjectivity increases the risk of bias and unsystematic measurement error. Third, there
is the issue of transparency. Freedom House do not release data on indicators or coding rules (Munck
and Verkuilen, 2002). This prevents tests of reliability.
18In order to make the growth coefficient in model 4 comparable with the corresponding coefficient
in model 1, the growth coefficient must be multiplied with its own standard deviation, and then
divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. From Table B.2 we see that the standard
deviation of SIP2 (in first differences) is 0.090. Furthermore, we remember from earlier interpretations
that the standard deviation for economic growth is 7.411. Consequently, the effect of economic growth
on democratization is estimated in model 4 to be −0.008×7.4110.090 = −0.659. The corresponding effect











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The 2SLS coefficient is furthermore significant at a one percent level, which corresponds
to the significant level when change in Polity2 is the dependent variable (model 1).
One should also note that the economic growth coefficients in models 5 and 6 are close
to being significant at a ten percent level (13 percent and 11 percent respectively).
This increases my confidence in the view that there might be a negative short term
effect of economic growth on democratization.
When change in FHI is the dependent variable (models 7-9), the negative economic
growth coefficient is only statistically significant in the Arellano-Bond GMM regres-
sion that does not control for time (model 8). This growth coefficient is furthermore
less negative than the corresponding estimate in the benchmark analysis (model 2).19
The growth estimate is moreover only significant at a ten percent level, while the
corresponding significance level when Polity2 is the dependent variable is 5 percent.
Thus, the general impression from Table 7.4 is that economic growth has less of an
effect on civil liberties and political rights than it has on the institutional features of
democracy.
All in all, the benchmark results are not robust against using changes in SIP2 and
FHI as dependent variables. However, the economic growth coefficient has a negative
sign in all models. It is furthermore statistically significant in some models and close
to significant in others. Thus, the general impression still remains; if anything, there
is a negative short term effect of economic growth on democratization.
Several studies in the literature use a dichotomous measure of democracy. Even
though I have argued that a continuous definition and conceptualization of democracy
is preferable, I use the democracy variable from Przeworski et al. (2000) as a further
robustness test of the results. The variable takes the value 1 for democratic countries
and 0 otherwise.20 A regime is considered to be democratic if the executive is directly
or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is de facto
existence of multiple parties outside regime front, there are multiple parties within the
legislature, and there has been non consultation of incumbent advantage. Observations
with regime transition within the year are coded according to the regime at the end
of the year (Teorell et al., 2011a, 32). In Table 7.5, logistic regressions are estimated.
Consequently, as simultaneity problems in the data are not addressed, the regression
estimate is less negative when change in SIP2 is the dependent variable, the coefficients are similar.
19From Table B.2 we see that the standard deviation for change in FHI is 0.456. Thus, the effect
of economic growth on democratization when FHI is the dependent variable (model 8) is predicted to
be −0.009×7.4110.456 = −0.153. The corresponding effect when change in Polity2 is the dependent variable
(model 2) is −0.055×7.4111.722 = −0.237.
20The variable has been updated by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) (see also Alvarez et al.
(1996) and Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski (1999)). I take the variable from the Quality
of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2011b).
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estimates are not reliable by themselves.21
Table 7.5: ML Logit 1980-2007, change in ACLP as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ML Logit ML Logit ML Logit FE ML Logit FE
Economic growth (t-1) -0.050*** -0.061** -0.11*** -0.16***
(-3.87) (-2.28) (-3.01) (-2.99)
Regime duration (t-1) -0.036* 0.037* 0.028
(-1.87) (1.84) (1.21)
Corruption (t-1) -0.32** -0.47 -0.69*
(-2.19) (-1.62) (-1.67)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.019 -0.032 -0.088
(-0.71) (-0.60) (-1.19)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) 0.49 0.76 0.017
(0.59) (0.82) (0.014)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) 0.18 -0.098 1.28*
(0.45) (-0.19) (1.69)
Primary education (t-1) -0.60 -2.01 -18.6
(-0.19) (-0.16) (-1.12)
Observations 4269 2031 490 490
Number of countries 165 114 25 25
Country FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: Robust t-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The economic growth coefficient has a negative sign in all models. The coefficient is
furthermore statistically significant at a one percent level in models 1, 3 and 4, and at
a five percent level in model 2. The results in Table 7.5 increase my confidence in the
benchmark conclusion for two reasons. First, the estimates illustrate that the negative
and statistically significant effect of income growth on democratization holds when a
dichotomous measure of democracy is applied. Second, the results in Table 7.5 clarify
that the benchmark results are not driven by the use of a linear model.
7.3.2 Alternative instrument: growth in rainfall
When using instruments, one can never fully rule out that these are not endogenous
to the dependent variable (democratization). This fact motivates the use of an al-
ternative instrument as a robustness check. Accordingly, I follow Miguel, Satyanath
212SLS and Arellano-Bond GMM commands for dichotomous variables exist. However, they are
not as well developed as the linear commands, and are not available in current versions of Stata.
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and Serengeti (2004) and use the annual growth rate in rainfall as an instrument
for economic growth in a sub-Saharan African sub-sample.22 Miguel, Satyanath and
Serengeti (2004) argue that weather shocks are plausible instruments for economic
growth in economies that largely rely on rain-fed agriculture. Weather shocks will
directly affect the economic growth in these countries, and therefore pick up variation
in their economic growth. At the same time it is very unlikely that growth in rainfall
will have a direct effect on democratization in a given country. Growth in rainfall is
not a good instrument for the whole sample because weather shocks are unlikely to
affect economic growth in more industrialized economies.
The rainfall instrument is used in combination with the global economic growth
instrument. In Table 7.6, models 1 and 3 repeat the second stage 2SLS results from
models where economic growth is instrumented through global economic growth and
climatic natural disasters. In models 2 and 4 on the other hand, growth in rainfall and
global economic growth is used as instruments on a sub-Saharan sub-sample. Control
variables are only included in models 3 and 4. Country fixed effects however, are
controlled for in all models.
From Table 7.6 we see that the economic growth coefficient is negative and statisti-
cally significant in all models. The growth estimate moreover becomes more negative
in models that include the alternative instrument (models 2 and 4). It is impossible
to say however, whether the increased coefficient size (in absolute value) stems from
a stronger growth effect on democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, or whether it is a
by-product of the instrument. While the economic growth coefficient becomes more
significant in model 2 compared to model 1, the growth estimate is more significant in
model 3 than it is in model 4. However, model 4 only includes 204 observations. This
makes it difficult to find significant effects.23
Accordingly, the benchmark results hold up well against including growth in rainfall
as instrument. This robustness test also suggests that the negative effect of income
growth on democratization holds for sub-Saharan African countries.
22Rainfall growth data are taken from Miguel, Satyanath and Serengeti (2004). I use the rainfall
variable that originally stems from U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization Climatic (FAO). There
are rainfall estimates for each point at which latitude and longitude degree lines cross, at 2.5 degree-
intervals. For more information about rainfall data see Miguel, Satyanath and Serengeti (2004).
23The rainfall instrument obtains a low t-value in the first stage of the 2SLS regression. This is
particularly true for the regression that does not include control variables (t-value being −0.77). A low
t-value in combination with Kleibergen-Paap statistics below 10, implies that the rainfall instrument
only is weakly correlated to economic growth, also in sub-Saharan African countries. However, the
results from the Hansen test do not imply that neither of the included instruments should be excluded
from the regression.
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Table 7.6: 2SLS 1980-2007, alternative instrument: growth in rainfall
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS(2nd) 2SLS(2nd) 2SLS(2nd) 2SLS(2nd)
VARIABLES original robtest orginal robtest
Economic growth (t-1) -0.030* -0.25** -0.20*** -0.23*
(-1.74) (-2.31) (-3.88) (-1.84)
Regime duration (t-1) 0.021*** 0.031*
(3.04) (1.66)
Corruption (t-1) -0.18** -0.055
(-2.52) (-0.20)
Oil rents of GDP -0.0071 -0.0057
(-0.73) (-0.19)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) 0.0046 -0.13
(0.020) (-0.28)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) 0.087 -0.38
(0.27) (-0.61)
Primary education (t-1) 2.85 20.0
(0.98) (1.04)
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV1 -3.76 – -1.52 –
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV2 8.57 3.93 5.58 3.39
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV3 – -0.77 – -1.87
Kleibergen-Paap test 41.552 7.776 16.505 9.004
Hansen test 0.168 0.798 0.289 0.402
Observations 3930 711 2019 204
Number of countries 155 43 113 20
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No
Notes: Dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on countries
in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV 1 denotes
climatic natural disaster instrument. IV2 denotes global economic growth instrument. IV3 denotes
growth in rainfall instrument. Kleibergen-Paap Waald F-statistic test for weak identification. H0:
Equation is weakly identified. Hansen test for overidentification. H0: Too many instruments are
not included.
7.3.3 Influential observations
Another concern is the possibility that certain influential observations are driving the
results in the main analysis. Observations with high leverage have abnormal values
on predictor variables. This renders them as candidates of being especially influential
82
for results. An observation is defined as influential if excluding it from the analysis
changes the key estimates substantially (Wooldridge, 2009, 325). Observations with
large residuals are often labeled outliers. They are observations that the model predicts
poorly, and can therefore affect the regression results. Figure 7.1 plots the squared
residuals from the OLS model (model 2 in Table 7.1) against their leverage.24
Figure 7.1: Normalized residual and Leverage, 1980-2007
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The observations that should raise concern in Figure 7.1 are those with both high lever-
age and high residuals (squared). The reason is that these are “abnormal” observations
with high influence. However, the plot does not seem to reveal any observations where
both abnormal leverage and residuals are observed simultaneously. Zambia stands out
in the plot with one observation with high leverage. However, the red line indicates
that the model predicts this case well (it has a low residual squared). Panama on the
other hand, has a high residual. Nevertheless, as this observation has low leverage, it
is not an influential observation and therefore not a cause of concern.
As a more thorough test for influence I compute two more statistics, cook’s D and
dfbeta. Cook’s D combines information about an observation’s leverage and residual.
It summarizes how much each observation influences the fitted model. The higher
the cook’s D, the higher the influence (Hamilton, 2009, 210). Dfbeta follows the same
strategy but is coefficient specific. Thus, it measures how much each observation affects
the given predictor coefficient (Hamilton, 2009, 210). I follow the convention in earlier
literature, and define observations with values of cook’s D and dfbeta higher than one
24It is not possible to compute cook’s D and dfbeta statistics based on the 2SLS and Arellano-Bond
GMM estimators. Thus, the statistics reported here are based on the ordinary least squares results.
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as potential influential observations (Christophersen, 2009, 163). Results are reported
in Figure B.2 and Figure B.1 in appendix B. These figures reveal that neither of the
observations have cook’s D or dfbeta values higher than the threshold. This indicates
that the message in the main analysis is not driven by influential observations.
Table 7.7: 2SLS and AB-GMM 1980-2007, excluding possible influential observations
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES 2SLS(2nd) 5/95 growth AB 5/95 growth AB 5/95 growth
Economic growth (t-1) -0.20*** -0.055** -0.055**
(-3.88) (-2.25) (-2.08)
Regime duration (t-1) 0.021*** 0.018 0.073*
(3.04) (0.58) (1.84)
Corruption (t-1) -0.18** -0.16 -0.27
(-2.52) (-1.11) (-0.83)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.0071 -0.015 0.0076
(-0.73) (-0.59) (0.24)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) 0.0046 -0.64 -0.40
(0.020) (-0.93) (-0.61)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) 0.087 -0.79 -0.49
(0.27) (-0.93) (-0.56)
Primary education (t-1) 2.85 26.7* 8.51
(0.98) (1.67) (0.52)
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV1 -1.52 – –
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV2 5.58 – –
Kleibergen-Paap test 16.505 – –
Sargan test – 0.248 0.346
Hansen test 0.289 0.649 0.513
AR(1) test – 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test – 0.830 0.507
Observations 2019 1805 1805
Number of countries 113 113 113
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses.
Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV 1 denotes climatic natural disaster
instrument. IV2 denotes global economic growth instrument. Kleibergen-Paap Waald F-statistic test for weak
identification. H0: Equation is weakly identified. Sargan and Hansen test for overidentification. H0: Too many
instruments are not included. AR(1) tests for first order serial correlation. AR(2) tests for second order serial
correlation. H0 in both AR tests is that there is not serial correlation.
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Since I am not able to compute cook’s D and dfbeta statistics based on the benchmark
models (those using instruments), I also carry out a more informal test of influential
observations. In Table 7.7 I re-estimate the benchmark models without observations
with “extreme” values on economic growth. In particular, all observations outside the
five and ninety five percentiles of the (unconditional) economic growth distribution are
excluded.25 Model 1 shows the results from a 2SLS estimation in which both standard
control variables and country specific effects controlled for. Model 2 reports the results
from the corresponding Arellano-Bond GMM regression. Model 3 is the same as model
2, except that also time fixed effects are controlled for.
From Table 7.7 we see that observations with particularly high and low economic
growth are not influential, as excluding them from the analysis does not alter the re-
sults. Both the economic growth coefficients and the corresponding significant levels
remain unchanged compared to Table 7.2 and Table 7.3. Thus, the overall conclu-
sion seems to be that influential observations do not drive the results found in the
benchmark analysis.
7.3.4 Taking censoring into account
Data are referred to as censored when their theoretical counterparts can take values
outside the bounds given in operational definitions. Censoring is especially relevant
if the researcher does not know how far the true value is located outside the bounds
(Long, 1997, 187). For Polity2, censoring implies that many countries in the sample
should be coded as −10 and 10. Suppose for instance that there exist a “true” distri-
bution of Polity2 that goes all the way to 20. Then observations will stack up at 10,
given that this is the upper bound. A democratic regime coded as 10 can for instance
be more democratic than another regime that is given the same Polity2 score. As they
are both coded as 10, it is impossible to say by how much.26 Figure 7.2 illustrates that
the Polity2 distribution piles up in both ends. There are particularly many countries
at the democratic end, indicating right-censoring. This is hardly surprising as most
OECD countries have been stable democracies (with Polity2 level of 10) for a long
time.
25The five and ninety five percentiles in economic growth have −62.37 and 88.72 percentage points
as cut-off points, respectively.
26For instance, in 2011 both Cape Verde and France had a Polity2 score of 10. In absolute terms
however, it seems likely that France is more democratic than Cape Verde.
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Censoring can be a problem because it violates the linear model assumption of normally
distributed error terms. From Figure 7.2 we see that Polity2 clearly does not have an
unconditional normal distribution. However, the assumption is that the conditional
error term (i.e. the error term where explanatory variables have been controlled for)
is normally distributed. Still, as Polity2 is not normally distributed it is unlikely that
the conditional error term will be. In particular, as factors that are left out of the
equation may explain why Polity2 is censored, they will prevent the conditional error
term from being normally distributed.
Two factors make it unlikely that censoring is driving the results in the main
analysis. First, as I control for country specific effects, countries that do not have any
variation in Polity2 are left out of the regression. By looking at the data it is evident
that most fully democratic countries (Polity2 equal to 10) have been stable since the
beginning of the sample (1980). This is also the case for several of the most autocratic
countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Qatar). Second, as I study change in Polity2 rather
than Polity2 level, censoring of the data is likely to pose less problems. However, to
make sure that my results are robust to censoring, I estimate a Tobit model. It is
based on a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation and takes censoring into account
(see e.g. Wooldridge (2009, 587-595), Long (1997) and Greene (2003) for textbook
derivations of the Tobit model).
Both right and left-censoring is controlled for in Table 7.8. It is however, not
possible to control for country-specific effects when using the Tobit estimator.27 In
27Just as in the Logit model, the non-linearity of the Tobit model implies that inclusion of country
dummies will not remove bias caused by omitted, time-independent variables. See Wooldridge (2009)
for further details.
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model 1 economic growth is the only included explanatory variable. Model 2 also
includes the standard set of control variables. Model 3 furthermore controls for time.
Table 7.8: ML Tobit 1980-2007, controlling for censoring
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ML Tobit ML Tobit ML Tobit
Economic growth (t-1) -0.0034 -0.018*** -0.014**
(-0.93) (-2.58) (-1.98)
Regime duration (t-1) -0.0013* -0.00032
(-1.74) (-0.42)
Corruption (t-1) -0.075** -0.13***
(-2.43) (-3.70)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.0077*** -0.0072**
(-2.64) (-2.53)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) -0.040 -0.15
(-0.22) (-0.83)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) -0.073 -0.024
(-0.80) (-0.27)
Primary education (t-1) -0.85 -1.97**
(-1.15) (-2.56)
Observations 4031 2033 2033
Left-censored observations 15 4 4
Right-censored observations 30 12 12
Country FE No No No
Year FE No No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clus-
tered on countries in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A proper interpretation of the Tobit coefficients involves some technical details which I
do not cover here (see e.g. Long (1997, 206-210) and Wooldridge (2009, 589-594)). The
reader should note that these coefficients are not directly comparable with those in the
main analysis. Still, one can always infer the sign of estimated effects. From Table 7.8
we see that the economic growth coefficient has a negative sign in all models. The
estimate is not statistically significant in model 1, which does not include additional
controls. This, however, is also the case in several of the benchmark regressions. Hence,
the results from the main analysis do not seem to be driven by censoring in Polity2.28
28As right-censoring looks most alarming in Figure 7.2, I also estimated the same Tobit models
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7.3.5 Excluding controls with high percentage missing
A potential problem with the benchmark regression results is that inclusion of control
variables substantially reduces the number of observations. To check how this obser-
vation affects the results, I now exclude the control variables with the highest amount
of missing.
Table 7.9: 2SLS and AB-GMM 1980-2007, excluding regressors with high missing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS(2nd) 2SLS(2nd) 2SLS(2nd) AB AB AB
VARIABLES all variables excluding 2 excluding 3 all variables excluding 2 excluding 3
Economic growth (t-1) -0.20*** -0.050** -0.036* -0.055** -0.050* -0.030
(-3.88) (-2.08) (-1.79) (-2.08) (-1.77) (-0.93)
Regime duration(t-1) 0.021*** 0.0053 0.0063** 0.073* -0.044 -0.065
(3.04) (1.37) (2.14) (1.84) (-0.55) (-0.82)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) 0.0046 0.11 0.32 -0.40 0.45 1.08
(0.020) (0.53) (1.32) (-0.61) (0.40) (0.75)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) 0.087 -0.083 -0.011 -0.49 1.67 -0.99
(0.27) (-0.65) (-0.091) (-0.56) (1.43) (-0.60)
Primary education (t-1) 2.85 -0.26 8.51 -3.74
(0.98) (-0.15) (0.52) (-0.19)
Corruption (t-1) -0.18** -0.27
(-2.52) (-0.83)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.0071 0.0076
(-0.73) (0.24)
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV1 -1.52 -3.30 -3.37 – – –
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV2 5.58 10.05 8.49 – – –
Kleibergen-Paap test 16.505 52.965 43.556 – – –
Sargan test – – – 0.346 0.808 0.999
Hansen test 0.289 0.174 0.163 0.513 0.731 0.978
AR(1) test – – – 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test – – – 0.507 0.472 0.941
Observations 2019 3343 3893 1805 3157 3957
Number of countries 113 152 155 113 153 159
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses. Significance levels are
denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV 1 denotes climatic natural disaster instrument. IV2 denotes global economic growth
instrument. Kleibergen-Paap Waald F-statistic test for weak identification. H0: Equation is weakly identified. Sargan and Hansen
test for overidentification. H0: Too many instruments are not included. AR(1) tests for first order serial correlation. AR(2) tests for
second order serial correlation. H0 in both AR tests is that there is not serial correlation.
From Table B.1 we see that three variables have particularly high fraction of missing
observations. Those are corruption (31.32 percent missing), oil rents share of GDP
while only controlling for right-censoring. This did not alter the results (not shown).
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(24.74 percent), and primary education (16.43 percent).
In Table 7.9 models 1 through 3 report the second stage results from 2SLS re-
gressions with control for country specific effects. In model 1 all control variables are
included. In model 2, corruption and oil rents of GDP are excluded. Finally, in model
3 primary education is also excluded. Models 4 through 6 report the results from
corresponding Arellano-Bond GMM regressions which control for both country and
time fixed effects.
Consider first the 2SLS results. The parameter of interest has a negative sign in
all models. However, once controls are thrown out, the coefficient drops in absolute
value and becomes substantially less significant. The significance level drops from one
percent in model 1 to ten percent in model 3. Note that the 2SLS estimate is in
line with those found using Arellano-Bond once the corruption and oil variables are
excluded.
The Arellano-Bond estimates reveal a stable point estimate, although it drops to
about −0.03 in model 6. However, the significant level is reduced from a five percent
level in model 4 to clearly insignificant in model 6.29 The insight from this exercise
seems to be that i) the negative point estimate found in the benchmark regressions is
relatively robust to exclusion of controls with high percentage missing, ii) the 2SLS
results become much more consistent with the Arellano-Bond results once corruption
and oil (the two regressors with the highest percentage missing) are thrown out, and
iii) inclusion of controls still increases the significance of the parameter of interest.
7.3.6 Extended time-series: 1950-2011
Data availability and concerns about quality of the data (and percentage of missing
observations) have motivated the use of data from 1980-2007 in the main analysis.
In this section however, the time-series is prolonged to range from 1950 to 2011.30
As control variables have different time-series they are not included in this exercise.
Furthermore, as the climatic natural disaster instrument starts in 1980, economic
growth is only instrumented through global economic growth in the 2SLS estimator.31
Models 1 and 2 report the result from the second stage 2SLS estimator which
controls for country specific effects for 1980-2007 and 1950-2011 respectively. Models
29The negative growth coefficient also becomes insignificant when all three variables are excluded
in Arellano Bond regressions that do not control for time (results not shown).
30Extending the time-series has serious implications for percentage of missing observations. In
particular, from 1980-2007 the economic growth variable has 1.82 percent missing observations. When
the time-series is extended to range from 1950 to 2011, the corresponding percentage is 17.93.
31This is the reason why the economic growth estimate in model 1 differs some from the regression
coefficient in model 3 in Table 7.2.
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3 and 4 show the result from the corresponding Arellano-Bond GMM regressions. In
models 5 and 6 time fixed effects are furthermore controlled for.
Table 7.10: 2SLS and AB-GMM 1980-2007 and 1950-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS(2nd) 2SLS(2nd) AB AB AB AB
VARIABLES 1980-2007 1950-2011 1980-2007 1950-2011 1980-2007 1950-2011
Economic growth (t-1) -0.038** -0.065*** -0.026* -0.030** -0.044 -0.039
(-2.16) (-4.20) (-1.76) (-2.01) (-1.30) (-1.55)
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV2 8.65 11.68 – – – –
Kleibergen-Paap test 74.815 136.336 – – – –
Sargan test – – 0.749 0.618 0.943 0.902
Hansen test – – 0.420 0.540 0.778 0.735
AR(1) test – – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test – – 0.780 0.430 0.048 0.080
Observations 4031 6636 4000 6470 4000 6470
Number of countries 159 159 159 159 159 159
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses. Significance
levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV2 denotes global economic growth instrument. Kleibergen-
Paap Waald F-statistic test for weak identification. H0: Equation is weakly identified. Sargan and Hansen test for
overidentification. H0: Too many instruments are not included. AR(1) tests for first order serial correlation. AR(2) tests
for second order serial correlation. H0 in both AR tests is that there is not serial correlation.
For models 1-4 we see that extending the time-series yields similar, although somewhat
more negative estimates of the economic growth effect on democratization. Further-
more, when the time-series is prolonged to range from 1950-2011, the growth coefficient
in the 2SLS estimator is significant at a one percent level rather than a five percent
level. Similarly, the Arellano Bond GMM estimate is significant at a five percentage
level rather than a ten percentage level. The increase in significance is not surprising
as the models with longer time-series have more observations. The economic growth
coefficient is not statistical significant in neither time-series when time fixed effects are
controlled for.
In sum, the negative effect of income growth on democratization does not seem to
be driven by choice of time-series. Rather, when prolonging the time-series to range
from 1950 to 2011, the effect of economic growth on democratization appears to be
even more negative.
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The overall conclusion from this section is that the results from the benchmark
analysis are relatively robust. In particular, they do not seem to be driven by the de-
mocratization measurement, external instruments, influential observations, censoring
of the data, nor the time-series. This section has also illustrated that the benchmark
results are not driven by the use of a linear model. In the next chapter I investigate
whether the negative effect of income growth on democratization matters more for




What kind of countries explain the
results?
The analysis in the previous chapter established that the estimated effect of income
on democracy turns negative when i) key variables are first differenced, and ii) income
is instrumented (either by other variables, or by its own lags). In this chapter I take
a step further and investigate what might cause these results. In particular I ask
three questions: First, does the effect of income growth on democratization depend
on regime type? For instance, are the results limited to a subset of autocratic, rich
states such as the OPEC countries? Second, does the direction of democratic change
matter for the effect of economic growth? For instance, is the negative effect limited
to countries on a path towards autocracy? Finally, using an error correction model,
I ask whether the effect of income on democracy changes with time. In particular I
ask whether there might be a long term effect that differs from the negative short run
effect. In this chapter I only comment upon the economic growth coefficient, unless
other estimates deviate substantially from expected values.
8.1 A regime dependent effect
Some contributions in the literature argue that economic growth has a stabilizing im-
pact on the regime type that is already in place.1 In particular, it is claimed that eco-
nomic growth increases the ruler’s popularity, regardless of regime type, and thus his
odds of survival. This argument has for instance been used to explain why China, who
has seen a substantial economic growth the last decades, remains autocratic (Bueno de
1See e.g. Kennedy (2010), Epstein et al. (2006), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Londregan and
Poole (1990) Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005).
93
Mesquita and Downs, 2005). Even though there clearly is a difference between regime
stability and democratization, it is interesting to examine whether the effect of income
growth on democratization differs between regime types. Following the argument
above, one might expect that the effect of income on democracy is positive in democ-
racies and negative in autocracies. Furthermore, Fayad, Bates and Hoeﬄer (2012)
find a negative effect of income on democracy in inconsistent regimes, i.e. those that
are neither democratic nor autocratic. Consequently, in this section I test the effect
of income growth on democratization in three sub-samples: democracies, inconsistent
regimes, and autocracies.
To determine whether there is a regime dependent effect of growth, models 1-
3 in Table 8.1 show the (second stage) 2SLS results for democratic (Polity2 ≥ 8),
inconsistent (−8 < Polity2 < 8), and autocratic regimes (Polity2 ≤ −8) respectively.
Models 4-6 report the results from corresponding Arellano-Bond GMM regressions.
Time dummy variables could not be included in the Arellano-Bond regressions because
the number of observations is severely reduced. However, both the standard set of
control variables and country fixed effects are controlled for in all models.
The results in Table 8.1 are not in line with the story told above (i.e. that economic
growth reinforces the ruling elite, and thereby has a positive effect in democracies and
negative effect in autocracies). First of all, only the coefficients in models 1 and 2
are statistically significant.2 Furthermore, if anything, the growth coefficient in model
1 should be positive to be supportive of the described regime dependent effect. As
neither of the coefficients in the autocratic models are close to being significant, the
results in Table 8.1 could on the contrary imply that there is a regime dependent effect,
but that it works the other way around. Economic growth seems to have a negative
effect on democratization in democracies and inconsistent regimes, but not a significant
effect in autocratic countries. However, the negative effect is never significant in the
Arellano-Bond regressions.
The results in Table 8.1 should be interpreted with caution as the number of
observations is now severely reduced. This is especially the case for the models that
only include autocratic countries (observations being 165 and 145). The fewer the
observations, the harder it is to find significant effects. That being said, the results in
Table 8.1 are robust against different thresholds for the regime types. I used {< −6, <
−7, < −8, < −9} as additional thresholds for autocracy, and {> 6, > 7, > 8, > 9} as
thresholds for democracy. In all cases inconsistent regimes were defined as the regimes
in between these two regime types. The results remained similar (not shown).
2The estimates that are significant however, are very similar to the comparable estimate in model
4 in Table 7.2 (coefficients being −0.23 and −0.26 compared to −0.198).
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Table 8.1: 2SLS and AB-GMM 1980-2007, a regime dependent effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 2SLS(dem) 2SLS(bet) 2SLS(aut) AB(dem) AB(bet) AB(aut)
Economic growth (t-1) -0.23* -0.26** -0.0040 -0.065 -0.0055 0.0017
(-1.82) (-2.41) (-0.46) (-1.52) (-0.19) (1.11)
Regime duration (t-1) 0.024 0.062*** 0.0045 -0.013 0.040 -0.00096
(1.04) (3.71) (1.40) (-1.12) (1.15) (-0.30)
Corruption (t-1) -0.033 -0.41** 0.019 -0.46* 0.18 0.014
(-0.43) (-2.10) (0.79) (-1.66) (0.60) (0.76)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.032 -0.023 0.0010 -0.026 -0.018 0.0034
(-1.01) (-0.88) (0.65) (-1.03) (-0.51) (1.48)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) -0.078 -0.044 0.060 -1.08 1.09 -0.043
(-0.36) (-0.099) (0.53) (-1.32) (1.11) (-0.63)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) 0.41 0.035 -0.022 -0.72 -0.57 -0.0045
(0.34) (0.081) (-0.91) (-0.69) (-0.53) (-0.15)
Primary education (t-1) 8.53 5.38 0.23 29.4* 7.96 -2.97
(1.13) (0.96) (0.34) (1.81) (0.27) (-1.39)
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV1 -1.21 -0.81 -10.81 – – –
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV2 4.81 3.05 0.67 – – –
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 12.031 5.647 61.703 – – –
Sargan test – – – 0.243 0.803 0.989
Hansen test 0.343 0.463 0.316 0.993 0.971 1.000
AR(1) test – – – 0.013 0.000 0.127
AR(2) test – – – 0.678 0.630 0.430
Observations 1001 851 165 914 746 145
Number of countries 65 72 21 66 73 21
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No No
Notes: Dependent variable first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on countries in parentheses. Significance
levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV 1 denotes climatic natural disaster instrument. IV2 denotes
global economic growth instrument. Kleibergen-Paap Waald F-statistic test for weak identification. H0: Equation is
weakly identified. Sargan and Hansen test for overidentification. H0: Too many instruments are not included. AR(1)
tests for first order serial correlation. AR(2) tests for second order serial correlation. H0 in both AR tests is that there
is not serial correlation.
From models 1-3 we see that the 2SLS instruments differ in strength across the three
regime types. While climatic natural disasters is a weak instrument in democratic and
inconsistent regimes (which also has been the tendency in former regressions) this in-
strument is strongly negatively correlated to economic growth in autocratic countries
(t-value being -10.81). Furthermore, while the global economic growth instrument has
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a t-value higher than 3 in both democratic and inconsistent regimes, this instrument
is only weakly correlated with economic growth in autocracies. However, the Hansen
tests imply that neither of the instruments should be excluded. The AR(1) test in
model 6 is furthermore higher than 0.05. This implies that one cannot reject the null
of no first order serial correlation in first differences, and points to potential model mis-
specification. However, the AR(2) test does not suggest second order serial correlation
either. Evaluated separately, this implies that no misspecification is detected.
8.2 The direction of democratization
As change in Polity2 is the dependent variable in this thesis, it is informative to
analyze whether the direction of that change matters. All linear models studied so
far have implicitly used the assumption that an increase in economic growth has the
same quantitative effect as a decrease, i.e. that increases and decreases in the growth
rate differ only in terms of the sign of the effect. For instance, the point estimate
in model 4 in Table 7.3 implies that an increase in the growth rate by one standard
deviation leads to 0.055×7.4 = 0.407 lower democratization. An equivalent statement
derived from this model is that a decrease in the growth rate by one standard deviation
increases democratization by 0.407. Here I ask whether such symmetry in the effects
is evident in the data. Alternatively, one could think that the estimated negative
effect depends on the regime a country is currently moving towards (e.g. that the
effect is only negative when countries have a negative change in democratization). I
perform a two-step exercise to analyze this question. First I check whether countries
on a democratic path experience a slow-down caused by higher income growth. This
is done by estimating the benchmark models on a sub-sample consisting only of those
observations with positive values of Polity2 (as measured in first differences). Second, I
test whether countries heading for autocracy get this process accelerated when income
growth rises. Then I look only at the sub-sample with negative democratization values.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 8.2 provide the second stage results from 2SLS regressions
using sub-samples “democratic path” and “autocratic path”, respectively. Models 3
and 4 report the results from the corresponding Arellano-Bond GMM regressions. Con-
trol variables and country fixed effects are included in all models. Time is controlled
for in the Arellano-Bond GMM models.
From Table 8.2 we see that economic growth has a negative coefficient in all models.
The coefficient however, is only statistically significant in models 1 and 3.3 Accord-
3The size of these coefficients are similar to those estimated in the main analysis (−0.161 compared
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ingly, it seems that the negative effect of economic growth on democratization is more
relevant for countries on their way to democracy than those heading for autocracy.
Table 8.2: 2SLS and AB-GMM 1980-2007, direction of democratic change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 2SLS(dem) 2SLS(aut) AB(dem) AB(aut)
Economic growth (t-1) -0.161*** -0.037 -0.039* -0.024
(-4.37) (-1.12) (-1.85) (-0.63)
Regime duration (t-1) 0.021*** 8.05e-08 0.0055 0.32***
(3.31) (0.00) (0.11) (3.49)
Corruption (t-1) -0.138** -0.033 0.15 -1.21***
(-2.50) (-0.90) (0.41) (-2.67)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.005 -0.002 0.026 0.0098
(-0.53) (-0.87) (0.81) (0.30)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) 0.025 0.014 0.21 -1.13
(0.14) (0.10) (0.20) (-1.59)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) -0.016 0.088 0.70 -2.25*
(-0.06) (1.09) (0.73) (-1.92)
Primary education (t-1) 2.760 0.271424 25.0 -12.7
(1.18) (0.20 ) (1.04) (-0.61)
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV1 -1.28 -1.75 – –
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV2 5.59 5.60 – –
Kleibergen-Paap test 16.070*** 16.811*** – –
Sargan test – – 0.224 0.001
Hansen test 0.163 0.297 0.406 0.518
AR(1) test – – 0.000 0.009
AR(2) test – – 0.761 0.062
Observations 1981 1878 1769 1681
Number of countries 113 113 113 113
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clustered on coun-
tries in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV
1 denotes climatic natural disaster instrument. IV2 denotes global economic growth instru-
ment. Kleibergen-Paap Waald F-statistic test for weak identification. H0: Equation is weakly
identified. Sargan and Hansen test for overidentification. H0: Too many instruments are not
included. AR(1) tests for first order serial correlation. AR(2) tests for second order serial
correlation. H0 in both AR tests is that there is not serial correlation.
In other words, the results in the main analysis do not seem to be driven by some
to −0.198, and −0.037 compared to −0.055).
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autocratic countries that have seen high growth followed by more autocracy. So why
is the negative effect stronger in countries heading for democracy? It is important
to keep in mind that the time series used here spans a period often referred to as
the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). In this period many countries,
including former Soviet nations (at least formally), became democracies. However,
several of these countries have subsequently returned to authoritarianism, Russia being
one example. Russia is also one of the countries in this time period that experienced
relatively high economic growth. These features might have an impact on the results.
Also, longer lasting democracies like Venezuela and Colombia experienced movements
away from democracy within the same period (Teorell, 2010, 2). At least the results
in Table 8.2 do not support the notion that the effect of income on democratization
changes sign when comparing democratic and autocratic paths.
8.3 Long term effects
The focus in this thesis is on the short term effects of income growth on democratiza-
tion, and the main analysis suggests that this effect is negative and significant. In this
section I investigate the long term effect. It is possible that economic development has
a negative short term effect on democratization, while at the same time slowly alter
the society in such a way that democratization becomes more likely over time. The
changes to society that Lipset (1959) and others discuss are after all not swift changes.
Rather they are time consuming, persistent processes. Take for instance education.
It will take many years to increase the general education level in a society. Accord-
ingly, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005, 79) argue that economic development can
threaten the survival of repressive governments in the long run because it raises the
probability that effective political competitors will emerge. There are at least three
reasons for this. First, in accordance with the theoretical arguments presented in this
thesis, income development raises the stakes of the political game by increasing the
economic returns available to the winner. Second, in a longer perspective, economic
development also creates more individuals with sufficient human and monetary re-
sources to get involved in politics (ibid). Third, following development, it is also more
likely that the population will stand up and demand democratic rights. In this section
I construct a regression model that makes it possible to determine long term effects.
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8.3.1 An error correction model
Motivated by the results from the unit root tests (section 6.2), I here establish an
error correction model (ECM) to estimate long term effects. Error correction models
are widely used when both dependent and explanatory variables contain unit roots,
which is what we have found here. See e.g. Verbeek (2008, 332) for further details. To
derive the error correction model, two terms are added to (4.1). First, ρyit−1, which
gives dynamics in y. Second, α1xit, which makes it possible to determine long-term
effects.4 By adding these two terms to (4.1), I now have the following equation (again
I abstract from control variables to ease the interpretation):
yit = β0 + ρyit−1 + α1xit + β1xit−1 + uit (8.1)
Then yit−1 is subtracted from both sides to get
yit − yit−1 = β0 + ρyit−1 + α1xit + β1xit−1 − yit−1 + uit
∆yit = β0 + (ρ− 1)yit−1 + α1xit + β1xit−1 + uit.
Remember, ∆yit = yit − yit−1 is defined as the first difference of Polity2. Next,
α1(xit−1 − xit−1) is added at the right side (this difference is zero by construction).
Then, a couple of manipulations yield
∆yit = β0 + (ρ− 1)yit−1 + α1xit + β1xit−1 + α1(xit−1 − xit−1) + uit
= β0 + (ρ− 1)yit−1 + α1(xit − xit−1) + (α1 + β1)xit−1 + uit
= β0 + (ρ− 1)yit−1 + α1∆xit + (α1 + β1)xit−1 + uit.
Now we have the error correction model that I estimate in this thesis (control variables
excluded):
∆yit = γ0 + γ1yit−1 + γ2∆xit + γ3xit−1 + uit (8.2)
where
γ0 = β0, γ1 = ρ− 1, γ2 = α1, and γ3 = α1 + β1.
The short term effect of economic growth on democratization is simply the economic
growth coefficient, i.e. γ2 = α1. Thus, this effect is the same in the error correction
4By including this term, I allow the short and long term effect of growth to have different signs.
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model as it is in all the other models. The long term effect however, can be derived
using the idea that the long run must represent some kind of a steady state (or balanced
growth path). That is, in the long run there should be no changes in x or y (once
trends are taken out). Consequently, in the long run we have ∆y = 0 and ∆x = 0.
This fact makes it possible to solve equation (8.2) for y in the steady state version of
this equation. Inserting ∆y = 0 and ∆x = 0 into (8.2) I now get
∆yit = γ0 + γ1yit−1 + γ2∆xit + γ3xit−1 + uit
0 = γ0 + γ1y + 0 + γ3x+ 0
0 = γ0 + γ1y + γ3x






The long term parameter of interest is therefore
−γ3
γ1




One should note that it is the long term level effects that are estimated in the error
correction model. In particular, it is the long term effect of a permanent shift in the
income level on level of democracy that is being parameterized.
8.3.2 Long term effects – Results
Table 8.3 reports the results when estimating equation (8.2) using the 2SLS and
Arellano-Bond GMM estimators. Model 1 reports the second stage results from a
2SLS regression that includes the standard set of controls as well as control for coun-
try fixed effects. Model 2 reports the results from the corresponding Arellano-Bond
GMM regression. In model 3 time fixed effects are furthermore controlled for.
Consider first the economic growth coefficient which represents the contempora-
neous effect of economic growth. It has a negative sign in all models, but is never
statistically significant. One reason for the lack of significance might be that economic
growth is no longer lagged. It is likely that it takes a while from the economic growth
occurs until it affects democratization. Furthermore, the error correction model is con-
structed to study long term effects and therefore adds more structure to the model.
This can make it more difficult to find significant short term effects. One should note
that the income level last year does not have any significant effect on Polity2 changes
either.
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Table 8.3: Error correction model 1980-2007, long term effects
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES 2SLS(2nd) AB AB
Polity2 (t-1) -0.188*** -0.22*** -0.53***
(-6.15) (-3.33) (-4.12)
Economic growth -0.066 -0.037 -0.019
(-1.53) (-1.05) (-0.71)
Economic level (t-1) 0.240 2.15 1.82
(0.76) (1.52) (1.38)
Regime duration (t-1) -0.013* -0.042 -0.15**
(-1.68) (-1.07) (-2.23)
Corruption (t-1) -0.164*** -0.15 0.032
(-2.81) (-1.01) (0.087)
Oil rents of GDP (t-1) -0.016** -0.026 -0.00097
(-2.51) (-1.41) (-0.033)
Civil conflict onset (t-1) -0.129 -1.28** -1.49
(-0.62) (-2.18) (-1.36)
Income inequality (t-1) (log) -0.326 -1.28** -0.70
(-1.35) (-2.05) (-0.93)
Primary education (t-1) -2.230 15.0 19.0
(-0.88) (0.75) (0.88)
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV1 -2.14 – –
2SLS 1st stage t-value IV2 7.13 – –
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 32.85 – –
Sargan test – 0.351 0.774
Hansen test 0.244 0.620 0.791
AR(1) test – 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test – 0.463 0.652
Observations 2019 1804 1804
Number of countries 113 113 113
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable first differenced Polity2. Robust t-statistics clus-
tered on countries in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV 1 denotes climatic natural disaster instru-
ment. IV2 denotes global economic growth instrument. Kleibergen-Paap
Waald F-statistic test for weak identification. H0: Equation is weakly iden-
tified. Sargan and Hansen test for overidentification. H0: Too many instru-
ments are not included. AR(1) tests for first order serial correlation. AR(2)
tests for second order serial correlation. H0 in both AR tests is that there is
not serial correlation.
101
Increased Polity2 level last year is predicted to have a negative effect on change in
Polity2 this year. This is true in all models. The coefficients are moreover statistically
significant at a one percent level. The negative effect is not surprising given that the
dependent variable is first differenced Polity2. Thus, lagged Polity2 level is at both
sides of the regression. However, on the left hand side it has a negative sign in front of
it. Thus, when the Polity2 level one year increases, the first differenced variable next
year decreases by construction.5
As explained above, the long term effect of a shift in income on democracy is
calculated by dividing the lagged economic level coefficient by the lagged democracy
coefficient. Accordingly, the long term effect in model 1 is given by 0.240
0.188
= 1.276. A
nonlinear test however, reveals that even though positive, this long term effect is not
statistically significant (combined z-value of 0.80). In model 2 the long term effect of
income on democracy is still predicted to be positive. In particular, it is estimated
to be 2.15
0.22
= 9.77. Furthermore, in contrast to model 2, the positive long term effect
is now statistically significant at a ten percent level (z-value of 1.66). However, to
be comparable with the economic growth coefficient the estimate must be divided by
100.6 Accordingly, in the long term, a one percentage increase in income (per capita)
is predicted to increase Polity2 by 0.0977. The variables are here interpreted in levels.
Even though statistically significant at a ten percent level, this effect can hardly be said
to be quantitatively important. In model 3 the long term effect of increased income
on democracy (both in levels) is given by 1.82
0.53
= 3.43. The non-linear test however
reveals that this effect is not statistically significant (z-value of 1.19).
In sum, I do not find strong evidence for any long term effect of income on democ-
racy. If anything however, the results suggest that the effect of income at level of
democracy turns positive with time. A positive long term effect of income on democ-
racy could offer a possible explanation for why most wealthy countries in the world
are democracies, even though I find the short term effect of income growth on democ-
ratization to be negative. Differences between short and long term effects can possibly
also provide a solution to the long lasting debate in the literature regarding Lipset’s
(1959) modernization theory. The disagreement could be the result of researchers
talking about (and testing for) different dynamics.
I close this chapter with a brief summary of the regression results presented here.
First, they indicate that the negative income growth effect on democratization matters
5This is obviously true when evaluating the effect of lagged levels in isolation. However, the
statement does not imply anything about the correlation between current and lagged levels of Polity2.
6The reason is that the economic growth variable has been multiplied by 100 in the previous part
of the study, to make direct interpretation in percentage points possible.
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more for democratic and inconsistent regimes than it does for autocratic regimes.
However, it should be noted that the results for autocratic regimes may not be reliable
as the number of observations is severely reduced. Second I find that the negative
income growth effect seems to matter more for countries already on a democratic
development path than it does for countries that are heading for autocracy. Finally,
I do not find any strong evidence for a long term effect of income on democracy. If





There is wide agreement among academics and policy makers that democracy is a
universal value—it brings with it a more secure, stable and prosperous society. Of
crucial importance is therefore to identify what creates democracy. In this thesis I
study the causal, short term effect of economic growth on changes in democracy. Data
tells us that wealthy countries are democratic, and common wisdom suggests these
countries are democratic because of their wealth. This observation seems to have
founded a premise in the policy debate, namely that higher income must stimulate
democracy. Even researchers who do not take this for granted, typically analyze a
one-sided hypothesis—the null of no effect is tested against the alternative—higher
income causes more democracy.
In this thesis I take one step back. As a point of departure, I make the observa-
tion that higher national income means there is more to grab for those who control
policy. Also, once in power a wealthy government has more resources to either buy or
fight off opponents. Thus, higher national income might provide both incentives and
opportunities for some players to push for autocracy. At least in the short run. This
renders the one-sided hypothesis improper. Yes, there are good reasons why income
should stimulate democracy. But there are also arguments pointing in the opposite
direction.
I construct a simple, theoretical model to formalize these ideas. A key result is that
when income reaches a certain level, then the equilibrium regime shifts from democracy
to autocracy. The purpose of the model is not to make claims about reality. Rather,
it is to demonstrate that a positive effect of income on democracy is not so obvious
from a conceptual point of view. Thus, we should consult data to form opinions about
causality.
Two econometric concerns make the empirical analysis extra challenging. First,
105
both the level of income and democracy display high persistence. This suggests that
these series might contain a unit root. Failing to take unit roots into account normally
results in biased estimates. Second, there is the problem of simultaneity. While
income might cause democracy, it can also be the case that democracy determines
income. For instance, if democratic development stimulates income growth, then the
naive OLS estimate will be biased upwards. While most previous work overlooks these
econometric issues, I perform a battery of specification tests to get an idea about their
relevance. In particular, to look for unit roots I conduct a Dickey-Fuller test on each
of the panels, and then combine information from all these tests into a single statistic.
The procedure is known as a Fisher type (unit root) test for panel data. The results
reveal that presence of unit root is likely in both income and democracy, when these
variables are measured in levels. I perform two tests for simultaneity. The first is
a Granger causality test, where each variable is regressed on its own lags as well as
the lags of the other variable. I find that income Granger causes democracy, but also
that democracy Granger causes income. This is consistent with causality running in
both directions, and hence a simultaneity problem. The results are significant at a
ten percentage level. The second test is a Hausman test, where OLS estimates are
compared with those from a model with instruments. Coefficients in the second model
are consistent under the null, implying that the OLS results are biased if these are
different. I find that they are, a further indication that there might be a simultaneity
problem.
With these results in mind, I proceed to ask the question: What can the data tell
us about causality when we take i) non-stationarity and ii) simultaneity into account?
To the best of my knowledge, this thesis presents the first attempt to address that
question in a systematic way. The unit root problem is solved by taking the first differ-
ence of income and democracy, and use the resulting values in the empirical analysis.
Consequently, it is the effect of economic growth on changes in democracy that is
estimated. However, if the level equation is correctly specified, then the estimate from
the first differenced equation will effectively reflect level effects. Intuitively, higher
economic growth must give higher income levels. This is true by the very definition of
these concepts. The same goes for the link between level and change in democracy. I
take the simultaneity problem into account by using an instrument variables approach.
That is, I estimate the short term causal effect of economic growth on democratiza-
tion by means of the two stage least squares estimator and the Arellano-Bond GMM
estimator. Climatic disasters and global economic growth are used as instruments in
the first case. Lags of economic growth are used in the second.
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The empirical analysis, which is based on a cross-country panel dataset from 1980
to 2007, provides a number of interesting results. First, I show that the data are ca-
pable of reproducing an estimated positive effect of income on democracy when unit
roots are not taken into account. Second, I demonstrate that this effect turns negative
once the variables of interest are first differenced. However, the estimated coefficients
are small in magnitude, and therefore of limited significance from a policy perspective.
Third, I find considerably larger estimates in absolute value when economic growth
is instrumented by climatic disasters and global income growth. That is, the point
estimates drop by a magnitude of ten, from about −0.02 to −0.2. The latter implies
that an increase in the growth rate by one standard deviation (7.4) reduces democra-
tization by about 1.46 the next year. This is arguably a very large decline, especially
given that a standard deviation change in the growth rate is quite common, while at
the same time the Polity2 variable is bounded between −10 and 10. Fourth, a more
modest negative effect is found using Arellano-Bond GMM. Then the point estimate
is −0.05, implying that the standard deviation increase in the growth rate reduces
democratization with about 0.4 the next year. In total, I show that the estimated
effect goes from positive to negative and statistically significant when the data are
first differenced, and to negative and quantitatively significant when growth is instru-
mented. These results question the popular notion that income stimulates democracy.
While contrasting most existing income–democracy studies (Fayad, Bates and Hoeﬄer
(2012) being the exception), my work is more in line with findings from the resource-
curse literature. There one emphasizes how higher income can pose a challenge rather
than a blessing to countries.
A large battery of tests is set up to check how robust the main results are. In
particular I look at alternative democratization measures, estimate Logit models, use
an alternative instrument, discard potential influential observations, estimate censored
models, exclude control variables with many missing observations, and extend the time
series to 1950. Interestingly, the results in the main analysis prove relatively robust
to these tests. The point estimates always remain negative, although not significantly
different from zero in some of the specifications.
I then ask what kind of observations are driving the results. The answer provided
is threefold. First, if anything, it seems that the negative effect is most important in
countries that are relatively democratic. Second, it seems that the effect is stronger
for countries on a transition path towards democracy. It is less strong in countries
on a path towards autocracy. Third, I find that the long term effect, if anything, is
positive. However, the long term effect is not significant at the ten percentage level.
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Furthermore, all these three results are hampered by trouble with few observations.
Even though I look into short term effects, a negative effect of income growth on
democratization should have substantial policy implications. Governments in devel-
oped countries, international financial agencies and aid organizations, seem to base
their policies on an underlying assumption that increased income has positive implica-
tions for democracy, peace and development more generally. If the effect of income on
democracy instead is negative, then providing financial aid and encouraging economic
development in poor autocratic countries can come at the expense of hampering de-
mocratization. The solution to this problem should not be to stop money transfers
to poor countries all together. Rather, one should ask how money transfers can be
designed to prevent negative effects on democratic processes. It is possibly better
to commit to long term aid programs rather than one time transfers, given that the
negative effect of income on democracy seems to hold only in the short term. Further-
more, as the theoretical framework suggests that the negative effect is the result of
rent-seeking behavior by the elite, payments should be conditioned upon being used
for the common good, rather than diverted for personal benefits for the few.
There are a number of factors that might lead the reader to question the results
from this thesis. In particular, one might ask whether results from a growth analysis
can really be used to say something about level effects. Furthermore, the assumption
of linearity might not hold. The instruments used in the benchmark regression can be
endogenous. There might be other data that are better suited for studying the research
question at hand, and other variables that should be controlled for. Moreover, the
results could have turned out differently if I had data ranging back to the 1800s etc.
Nevertheless, the results from this thesis suggest that one should not take for granted
the convention that income stimulates democracy. Furthermore, one should go back
and critically assess the existing literature at the field and ask whether studies have
been too constrained by a one-sided hypothesis and preconceived assumptions about
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Appendix A
Review of formulas for geometric
series
A generic player i’s period utility in period t, denoted ui,t, is determined by his own
action and the other player’s action (in that period).However, in infinitely repeated
games, the players want to maximize their lifetime utility denoted U . The lifetime
utility for player i is assumed to be an infinite discounted sum of period utilities,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a time discount factor:
U = ui,0 + δui,1 + δ




The discount factor effectively downplays the present value of future realizations, and
captures the notion that players care more about the current than the future. Through-
out the thesis I will make extensive use of the formula for a geometric sum. The formula
is repeated below for convenience. Consider a geometric sum with k number of terms
and quotient δ 6= 1. The sum can then be written (see Sydsæter, Seierstad and Strøm
(1990) for details)
δ0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3 + . . .+ δk−1 =
1− δk
1− δ . (A.2)











Table B.1: Percentage missing values 1980-2007
Variables Missing Total Percent missing
Polity2 277 4406 6.29
Economic growth 114 4406 2.59
Climatic disaster 155 4406 3.52
Global economic growth 114 4406 2.59
Regime duration 218 4406 4.95
Corruption 1380 4406 31.32
Oil rents of GDP 1090 4406 24.74
Civil conflict onset 3 4406 0.07
Income inequality 82 4406 1.86
Primary education 724 4406 16.43
Table B.2: Summary statistics for robustness models
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Sip2 0.535 0.376 0 0.98 3982
Change Sip2 0.006 0.090 -0.887 0.958 3908
FHI 3.836 2.026 1 7 4221
Change in FHI -0.031 0.456 -3.5 4.5 4252
ALCP 0.476 0.499 0 1 4363
Change ALCP 0.009 0.141 -1 1 4335
Growth in rainfall 0.008 0.105 -0.468 0.768 780
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Figure B.1: Cook’s D, 1980-2007
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Table C.1: Frequently used regression commands in STATA
Model Command
OLS reg dep var var list if year > 1979 & year < 2008,
robust cluster(country)
OLS-FE xtreg dep var var list if year > 1979 & year < 2008,
fe robust cluster(country)
2SLS xtivreg2 dep var (end var = iv) if year > 1979 &
year < 2008, fe robust cluster(country) first
AB-GMM xtabond2 dep var end var var list if year > 1979 &
year < 2008, twostep noleveleq
gmmstyle(end var var list, lag(2 .) c) nomata robust
AB-GMM xtabond2 dep var end var var list t36-t58 if year > 1979 &
year < 2008, twostep noleveleq
gmmstyle(end var var list, lag(2 .) c) nomata robust
All Stata codes are on the accompanying CD. The do-file can also be provided upon
request, contact me at ingriras@student.sv.uio.no.
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